BAEZA-GALINDO
29 I. & N. Dec. 1 (2025)
Rule of Law:
Proximity in time is a necessary but not sufficient condition to establish that two crimes arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii); instead, separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, where neither was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, constitute separate schemes.
Facts:
- Carlos Manuel Baeza-Galindo is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1989.
- On July 23, 2008, while driving his pickup truck under the influence of alcohol, Baeza-Galindo struck a group of pedestrians in Midland, Texas, killing a 22-year-old woman and injuring her 26-year-old sister-in-law, her 8-month-old son, and her 9-month-old daughter.
- The victim's son suffered a lacerated liver and had to be airlifted for emergency medical treatment.
- After striking the four victims, Baeza-Galindo drove home without stopping to render aid.
- Upon arriving home, Baeza-Galindo told his wife that it felt like something hit his truck.
- Pieces of a stroller were later found embedded in Baeza-Galindo's truck's grill, and blood stains and clothing fabric were discovered in the truck’s wheel wells.
Procedural Posture:
- On December 12, 2008, Carlos Manuel Baeza-Galindo was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and failure to stop and render aid in Texas.
- The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently charged Baeza-Galindo as removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.
- Baeza-Galindo filed a motion for termination of proceedings before an Immigration Judge, arguing that his two convictions arose from a single scheme of criminal misconduct.
- The Immigration Judge (trial court) concluded that Baeza-Galindo's convictions did arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct and therefore terminated the removal proceedings.
- The Department of Homeland Security (appellant) appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (appellee is Carlos Manuel Baeza-Galindo).
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Issue:
Does a respondent's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and a separate conviction for failing to stop and render aid, arising from the same incident but having distinct criminal objectives, constitute two crimes arising from a "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for purposes of removability?
Opinions:
Majority - Petty, Appellate Immigration Judge
No, Carlos Manuel Baeza-Galindo's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and failing to stop and render aid do not arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct, making him deportable. The Board of Immigration Appeals clarified its long-standing interpretation of "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). Building upon precedent like Matter of D- and Matter of Adetiba, the Board reiterated that proximity in time between two crimes is a necessary but not sufficient condition to establish a single scheme; the absence of a substantial interruption does not conclusively prove a single scheme. The Board rejected the Immigration Judge's reasoning that failing to stop was connected because it wouldn't be a crime without the prior assault, or that the failure to stop was attributable to avoiding capture for the assault. Congress's intent for the "single scheme" exception was to protect against deportation for what was "essentially one act" (Matter of B-), such as where one physical act is viewed from two viewpoints (e.g., lesser offense) or where a single act concurrently harms multiple victims in the same way. The exception also applies where multiple turpitudinous acts occur within a short time, involve the same parties, and the first act(s) are committed for the purpose of making possible the specific criminal objective accomplished by the last act(s) (Matter of Z-, Matter of Islam). However, attempting to avoid capture or responsibility for a completed crime is considered a separate moral wrong with a new criminal objective, distinct from the initial crime's accomplishment (Nguyen v. INS, Matter of D-). In this case, the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was not committed with the intention of facilitating or making possible the later crime of failing to stop and render aid. The record contains no suggestion that Baeza-Galindo intentionally struck the pedestrians for the purpose of leaving them dead or injured. Therefore, the two convictions were premised on separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, neither of which was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, and thus constitute separate schemes of criminal misconduct. The DHS's appeal is sustained, the Immigration Judge's decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standard for determining a "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under immigration law, reinforcing that temporal proximity alone is insufficient and emphasizing the critical distinction of criminal objectives. By affirming that post-crime actions aimed at evading capture constitute distinct moral wrongs rather than subordinate acts of an original scheme, the BIA narrows the scope of the single scheme exception. This interpretation will likely increase the number of non-citizens subject to removal under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, providing a more stringent framework for immigration judges assessing removability in such cases.
