Babbitt v. Youpee
519 U.S. 234 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A federal statute that severely restricts the rights of descent and devise for a specific class of property, even if amended to be less restrictive than a prior unconstitutional version, still constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment if it amounts to a virtual abrogation of those essential property rights.
Facts:
- A 19th-century federal policy of allotting communal Indian lands to individual tribal members resulted in extreme 'fractionation' of land ownership over successive generations.
- As owners passed their interests to multiple heirs, many land parcels became owned by dozens of individuals, making the land economically unproductive and administratively burdensome.
- To combat this, Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), containing a provision (§ 207) that forced small, low-income fractional interests to transfer ('escheat') to the tribe upon the owner's death.
- After the Supreme Court found the original version unconstitutional in Hodel v. Irving, Congress amended § 207 to allow the small interests to be devised to a person who already owned another interest in the same parcel.
- William Youpee, a tribal member, owned several such small fractional interests in various land parcels, collectively valued at $1,239.
- Youpee's will devised these interests to his children and other descendants, all of whom were enrolled tribal members.
- Upon Youpee's death, under the terms of the amended § 207, his interests were designated to escheat to the respective tribes instead of passing to the devisees named in his will.
Procedural Posture:
- An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of the Interior determined that William Youpee's devised interests fell under amended § 207 and must escheat to the tribes.
- Youpee's heirs (respondents) appealed to the Department of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, which dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to decide the constitutional claim.
- Respondents sued the Secretary of the Interior in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, alleging the law was an unconstitutional taking.
- The District Court, a trial court, found in favor of the respondents and granted declaratory and injunctive relief.
- The Secretary of the Interior (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the amended § 207 was still an unconstitutional taking.
- The United States (petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, the highest court, for a writ of certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, which requires small, low-income fractional interests in Indian lands to escheat to the tribe upon death unless devised to an existing owner of an interest in the same parcel, effect an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act effects an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. The amendments do not cure the constitutional deficiency identified in Hodel v. Irving because the law continues to be an extraordinary regulation that amounts to the virtual abrogation of the right to devise property. Although the amended law permits devise to a narrow class of individuals—other owners in the same parcel—this severely restricts the owner's right to direct the descent of their property and 'shrinks drastically the universe of possible successors,' a group unlikely to include lineal descendants. Like the original, the amended statute focuses on the income generated by the land rather than its overall economic value, which may not be de minimis. The character of the government regulation, which completely abolishes the rights of descent and devise for a class of property owners, remains the dispositive factor, rendering the statute unconstitutional.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No, the amended Section 207 does not effect an unconstitutional taking. The federal government has a strong and valid interest in minimizing the fractionated ownership of Indian lands to promote productive development, which justifies the legislative remedy. Property owners are charged with knowledge of relevant statutes affecting their property, and William Youpee had over six years to adjust his affairs to comply with the law, such as by selling his interests, gifting them, or placing them in a trust. His failure to pass on his property was the result of inadequate legal advice or awareness, not a constitutional defect in the statute. Congress has the power to require owners to consolidate their holdings or risk their interests being deemed abandoned.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the holding of Hodel v. Irving, cementing the rights of descent and devise as fundamental and constitutionally protected elements of property ownership. The Court signals that legislative attempts to solve complex property issues like land fractionation cannot be achieved by extinguishing these core rights, even for a valid public purpose, without providing just compensation. By striking down the amended statute, the Court clarifies that minor modifications are insufficient if the fundamental flaw—the 'virtual abrogation' of inheritance rights—remains. This forces Congress to consider less intrusive or compensatory solutions, such as funding voluntary land buy-back programs or providing fair market value for escheated interests, significantly impacting future federal Indian land policy.
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