Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 14 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 257, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440 (2008)
Rule of Law:
For disability discrimination or failure to accommodate under FEHA, an employer must have actual or imputed knowledge of the employee's disability at the time of the adverse action; however, for retaliation under CFRA, an employee's notice of hospitalization for a serious medical condition can be sufficient to trigger the employer's duty to inquire further and designate leave, even if the employee does not explicitly request CFRA leave or the employer's decision-makers are not personally aware the absence is legally protected.
Facts:
- Chelsea Food Services (a division of Continental Airlines) employed Henry Avila from 1998 through January 2005.
- Chelsea's attendance policy stipulated termination for employees who accrued seven or more recordable absences in any rolling 12-month period.
- In December 2004, Henry Avila was hospitalized for acute pancreatitis and missed four days of work.
- Upon returning to work in December 2004, Henry Avila testified that he provided two Kaiser Permanente medical forms to the manager on duty, indicating he was unable to work for a few days, was hospitalized from December 16 to 19, and was cleared to return to work on December 21.
- Neither Kaiser form specified the nature of Henry Avila's illness or injury, nor indicated any ongoing work restrictions.
- Henry Avila told approximately 50 coworkers that he had been sick but did not discuss his pancreatitis with his supervisors or managers.
- In January 2005, Henry Avila incurred another recordable absence, bringing his total to seven within the relevant 12-month period.
- On January 18, 2005, Chelsea's human resources manager, Daysi Bellamy, determined that Henry Avila had accrued seven absences and decided to suspend and terminate him based on the attendance policy.
Procedural Posture:
- Henry Avila was terminated from his employment with Chelsea Food Services, a division of Continental Airlines, Inc.
- Henry Avila commenced an action in state trial court in October 2005 against Continental Airlines, Inc.
- The surviving claims in the trial court included: (1) disability discrimination in violation of FEHA, (2) failure reasonably to accommodate disability in violation of FEHA, (3) wrongful termination in retaliation for exercising CFRA rights, and (4) a Tameny claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
- Continental Airlines, Inc. moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- The trial court granted Continental's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Avila's FEHA claims failed due to lack of employer knowledge of his disability, his FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim failed because he did not request accommodation, his CFRA claim failed because he did not request leave, and his Tameny claim failed as it was predicated on the other insufficient claims.
- Henry Avila timely appealed the trial court's judgment.
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Issue:
Does an employee's submission of medical forms indicating hospitalization, combined with calling in sick, constitute sufficient notice to an employer to establish (1) a disability discrimination or failure-to-accommodate claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), or (2) a retaliation claim for exercising rights under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), when the employee is subsequently terminated for excessive absences?
Opinions:
Majority - Mosk, J.
No, an employee's submission of medical forms indicating hospitalization, combined with calling in sick, is not sufficient to establish a disability discrimination or failure-to-accommodate claim under FEHA when the employer lacked knowledge of the employee's disability at the time of termination. To establish a FEHA discrimination claim, an employee must show the employer harbored discriminatory intent, which requires employer knowledge of the disability when the adverse employment decision was made. Vague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity, or mere hospitalization without diagnostic information, are insufficient to put an employer on notice of a qualifying disability under FEHA. The Kaiser forms only communicated that Avila was hospitalized for three days and unable to work for four, without specifying a condition that qualified as a disability under FEHA. Informing Continental merely that plaintiff had been hospitalized was not sufficient to put Continental on notice, as hospitalization could be for non-disabling reasons. Knowledge of an employee's illness is not equivalent to knowledge of a FEHA-qualifying disability, and knowledge shared with coworkers is not imputed to decision-makers unless those coworkers were 'substantial contributors' to the termination decision. Post-termination statements about disability are irrelevant to the employer's intent at the time of termination. For a failure-to-accommodate claim, an employer is only required to accommodate a 'known physical... disability,' and the employee bears the burden of giving notice. The Kaiser forms and calls were not sufficient to inform Continental of a FEHA disability or the physical limitations it caused. Therefore, the summary adjudication of plaintiff's FEHA claims was affirmed. Yes, an employee's submission of medical forms indicating hospitalization, combined with calling in sick, can be sufficient to establish a retaliation claim for exercising rights under CFRA, triggering the employer's duty to inquire further and designate the leave. CFRA defines a 'serious health condition' to include inpatient care in a hospital. An employee provides sufficient notice for CFRA if they give 'verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs CFRA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave.' The employee need not explicitly invoke CFRA or FMLA but must state the reason. If the need is unforeseeable, notice must be given 'as soon as practicable.' The December 19 Kaiser form indicating hospitalization could suggest a 'serious medical condition' under CFRA and thus serve as a 'request' for leave, especially when given as soon as practicable after an emergency. Under CFRA regulations, the employer has the responsibility to inquire further if more information is needed and to designate the leave as CFRA-qualifying. For causation, the 'because of' language in CFRA only requires proof of a causal connection between the employee's protected conduct (the absences) and the adverse employment action, not that the decision-makers knew the conduct was legally protected. Continental did not dispute that Chelsea assessed two recordable absences against Avila for his hospitalization and recovery, and that Bellamy and Johnson knew of and relied on those absences to discharge him. If the trier of fact concludes that Avila requested CFRA-qualifying leave, then Continental’s admission that those absences caused his discharge is sufficient to establish a causal connection. Therefore, the summary adjudication of plaintiff's CFRA and Tameny claims was reversed, and the matter remanded.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kriegler, J.
I concur in the majority’s holding that summary judgment was properly granted on Henry Avila’s FEHA claims. However, no, Henry Avila's submission of medical forms and calling in sick was not sufficient to establish a CFRA retaliation claim, because the undisputed facts show he never explicitly requested leave, and the decision-makers had no knowledge of his hospitalization. The express language of CFRA (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (a)) requires an employer 'to refuse to grant a request by any employee' for leave, making a request by the employee a trigger for the right. Furthermore, the implementing regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7297.4, subd. (a)(1)) requires 'at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs CFRA-qualifying leave,' and that 'the employee must state the reason the leave is needed.' Henry Avila's own deposition testimony explicitly states that he never asked Chelsea or any manager for a leave of absence, nor asked for his absences to be treated as leave. This unambiguous testimony, combined with the fact that he first mentioned CFRA months after termination, means no request was made, and thus no employer obligation to inquire was triggered. Additionally, the persons responsible for the decision to terminate Avila (Daysi Bellamy and Judy Tañes) presented uncontroverted declarations that they had no knowledge of Avila’s hospitalization before making the termination decision. There cannot be an unfair employment practice under CFRA where the employer has no knowledge of the employee’s condition and no request for leave is made by the employee, similar to how FEHA requires employer knowledge for discrimination claims. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment on the CFRA claim should also be upheld.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinct employer obligations and notice requirements under California's FEHA and CFRA. It establishes a higher bar for employee notice regarding FEHA disability claims, requiring actual or imputed employer knowledge of a disability itself, not just an illness. In contrast, for CFRA leave claims, the court adopted a lower threshold, emphasizing the employer's affirmative duty to inquire and designate leave when an employee provides notice of a serious health condition (like hospitalization), even if the employee doesn't explicitly invoke CFRA or if the decision-makers lack subjective knowledge that the absence is legally protected. This distinction significantly impacts employers with no-fault attendance policies, obligating them to be proactive in assessing CFRA eligibility for medically related absences to avoid wrongful termination claims.
