Avery v. Midland County
390 U.S. 474, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 2061, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that when a state delegates lawmaking power to local government and provides for the election of local officials from districts, the districts must be of substantially equal population. This 'one person, one vote' principle applies to local government units with general governmental powers over the entire geographic area they serve.
Facts:
- Midland County, Texas, was governed by a five-member Commissioners Court.
- One member, the County Judge, was elected at-large from the entire county.
- The other four commissioners were elected from four single-member districts with vastly unequal populations: 67,906; 852; 414; and 828.
- This disparity resulted from placing the city of Midland, where 95% of the county's population resided, into a single district.
- The Commissioners Court exercised a wide range of general governmental powers, including setting the county tax rate, issuing bonds, adopting the budget, building roads, and administering public welfare services.
- These powers and the taxes imposed by the court affected all citizens of the county, both within and outside the city of Midland.
Procedural Posture:
- Hank Avery, a resident and taxpayer, sued the Midland County Commissioners Court in the Midland County District Court (state trial court).
- The trial court ruled in favor of Avery, ordering the commissioners to adopt a new apportionment plan based on substantially equal population.
- The Commissioners Court appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, ruling for the Commissioners Court.
- Avery appealed to the Texas Supreme Court (highest state court).
- The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the existing districting scheme impermissible but holding that factors other than population could be considered in a new plan.
- Avery then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause require that the districts for a county governing body, which exercises general governmental powers, be apportioned on a basis of substantially equal population?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires that the districts for a county governing body with general governmental powers be apportioned on a basis of substantially equal population. The Equal Protection Clause applies to all actions of a state, including those carried out by its political subdivisions like counties. Depriving voters of an equally weighted vote in a local election is constitutionally indistinguishable from doing so in a state legislative election, as both involve the exercise of governmental power. While the Constitution allows for flexibility and innovation in local government structures, it imposes a fundamental requirement that units with general governmental powers over an entire area not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
No, the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel this result. First, the Court lacks jurisdiction because the Texas Supreme Court's decision rested on an adequate state ground and was not a final judgment. On the merits, extending the 'one person, one vote' rule of Reynolds v. Sims to the nation's 80,000 local government units is unjustifiable and ill-advised. Unlike state legislatures where malapportionment was politically uncorrectable, local government structures can be reformed by state legislatures, which are now properly apportioned. Furthermore, the immense variety and specialized functions of local governments make a rigid, population-based formula inappropriate and potentially counterproductive.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Fortas
No, the Court should not impose a rigid one person, one vote formula on local governments. The Midland County Commissioners Court has specialized functions directed primarily to its rural area and population, meaning residents do not have the same interests at stake in its elections. Applying a simplistic population-based rule ignores the stark differences in the impact of the Commissioners Court on urban versus rural citizens and may achieve arithmetic equality at the expense of substantive equality. The Court should allow for more flexibility, permitting apportionment schemes that account for the complex reality of local governance, rather than imposing an authoritarian formula that could be destructive of important political and social values.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
No, the apportionment of a local government is too complex a matter to be resolved by a simple arithmetic formula under the Constitution. The writ should be dismissed. The reasoning in Mr. Justice Fortas's dissent correctly highlights the problems with applying a rigid rule to local government. This case further demonstrates that the original 'one person, one vote' doctrine from Reynolds v. Sims was a misapplication of the Equal Protection Clause for state legislatures as well.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly expanded the 'one person, one vote' doctrine established in Reynolds v. Sims, applying it to thousands of units of local government across the United States. By extending this constitutional requirement to counties, cities, and other local bodies with 'general governmental powers,' the Court federalized the standards for local electoral districting. The ruling forced widespread reapportionment of local government bodies, shifting political power in many areas from historically overrepresented rural regions to more populous urban and suburban centers. However, the Court left open the question of whether this strict standard applies to 'special-purpose' units of government, creating a distinction that would be litigated in future cases.
