Averett v. Shircliff
1977 Va. LEXIS 179, 218 Va. 202, 237 S.E.2d 92 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
When tangible personal property, such as a motor vehicle, is damaged but not destroyed, the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its former condition plus an allowance for any depreciation in value after repairs, provided this amount is less than the total diminution in market value immediately after the injury.
Facts:
- Henry T. Averett's automobile struck and damaged James V. Shircliff's parked 1973 Mercedes-Benz.
- Shircliff's car was towed to a Mercedes-Benz garage where the owner, Kenneth Hammersley, advised Shircliff that the car could not be repaired.
- Shircliff subsequently sold the damaged vehicle to Hammersley for $5,101, which was the highest of four bids.
- Hammersley then had the car repaired for an estimated cost of $3,000.
- Approximately nine months after the accident, Hammersley sold the repaired car for $8,995.
- Expert testimony conflicted: Shircliff's witness claimed the car could not be restored to its pre-accident condition, while Averett's witnesses testified it could be repaired for $2,631.04 with a 7-10% allowance for depreciation.
- The parties' experts agreed that the car's fair market value immediately before the accident was between $13,000 and $13,500.
Procedural Posture:
- James V. Shircliff sued Henry T. Averett in a trial court to recover damages to his automobile.
- Averett admitted liability, and a jury trial was held solely on the issue of damages.
- The jury returned a verdict for Shircliff, awarding $4,000 for the car and $160 for personal property.
- Shircliff filed a post-trial motion asking the court to set aside the jury's verdict and enter judgment for $8,059.
- The trial court judge granted Shircliff's motion, set aside the verdict, and entered a final judgment for Shircliff for $8,059.
- Averett (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Virginia, with Shircliff as the appellee.
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Issue:
In a tort action for damage to a motor vehicle, does the plaintiff have the right to elect as their measure of damages the total diminution in the vehicle's value, or is the proper measure determined by the fact-finder based on whether the vehicle is reparable for less than that diminution?
Opinions:
Majority - I'Anson, C.J.
No, a plaintiff does not have an absolute right to elect the measure of damages; rather, the jury must determine the proper measure based on the evidence presented. The court adopted the general rule that where personal property is damaged but not destroyed, the measure of damages is the difference between the market value before and after the injury. However, an exception applies where the property can be restored by repairs for less than this diminution in value; in such cases, the recoverable amount is the reasonable cost of repairs plus a reasonable allowance for any depreciation remaining after the vehicle is repaired. The court rejected the Restatement of Torts § 928, which gives the plaintiff the election, reasoning that the jury, not the plaintiff, should make the determination based on conflicting factual evidence. Because the evidence was disputed as to whether the car could be restored and the cost of such restoration, these were questions for the jury, and the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict.
Analysis:
This case establishes the definitive rule in Virginia for calculating damages to partially destroyed personal property, specifically motor vehicles. By rejecting the Restatement's plaintiff-election approach, the court vests the decision-making authority with the fact-finder (the jury). This prevents a plaintiff from receiving a windfall by claiming the full diminution in value when a less expensive repair could make them whole. The decision emphasizes that damage calculation is a factual inquiry based on principles of reasonable compensation, not a strategic choice for the injured party.
