Automotive Parts & Accessories Association v. Boyd
33 Fed. Reg. 2945 (1968) (1968)
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Rule of Law:
Unless a statute explicitly requires that an agency's rules be "made on the record after opportunity for agency hearing," the agency may use the informal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures provided by Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The mere requirement of judicial review based on a "record" is insufficient to trigger the formal rulemaking procedures of APA Sections 7 and 8.
Facts:
- Sterling Products Co., Inc. was a manufacturer of automotive accessories, including head restraints designed to be installed by consumers after a car was purchased.
- Automotive Parts & Accessories Association, Inc. (APAA) and Automotive Service Industry Association (ASIA) were trade associations representing the aftermarket auto accessory industry.
- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's predecessor agency proposed Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 202 under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.
- The proposed standard required that all new passenger cars manufactured for sale in the United States after January 1, 1969, must be equipped with factory-installed front seat head restraints.
- This factory-installation requirement would effectively eliminate the aftermarket for head restraints, thereby causing economic harm to Sterling, APAA, ASIA, and their members.
Procedural Posture:
- The Federal Highway Administrator promulgated Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 202 using informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.
- Sterling Products Co., Inc., Automotive Parts & Accessories Association, Inc., and Automotive Service Industry Association (petitioners) filed petitions for reconsideration with the agency.
- The Administrator denied the petitions for reconsideration.
- The petitioners filed a petition for review directly with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, seeking to have the standard declared invalid.
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Issue:
Does the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, by stating the Administrative Procedure Act shall apply to its orders, require the agency to use formal rulemaking procedures under Sections 7 and 8 of the APA to promulgate safety standards?
Opinions:
Majority - McGowan
No. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not require formal rulemaking procedures; therefore, the agency's use of informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking under Section 4 of the APA was appropriate. The statutory language making the APA applicable is ambiguous, but the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to permit, not require, formal rulemaking, leaving the choice of procedure to the agency's discretion. The Act's overall structure, which emphasizes informal consultation and research, is more consistent with the flexibility of informal rulemaking, which is better suited to making broad, legislative-style policy determinations than resolving specific factual disputes. The judicial review provisions, which reference a "record" and the APA's review standards, do not compel a different result, as a sufficient record for review is created through the written submissions in a Section 4 proceeding.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational administrative law ruling that clarifies the threshold for triggering formal rulemaking procedures. By holding that a statute must contain specific language requiring a decision "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," the court established informal notice-and-comment as the default for most agency rulemaking. This decision empowers agencies with procedural flexibility, allowing them to create regulations more efficiently. However, the court also signaled the beginning of the "hard look" doctrine of judicial review, cautioning that an agency's "concise general statement" must be sufficient for a reviewing court to understand the major policy issues and the agency's rationale, ensuring that agency discretion is not arbitrary or irrational.
