International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
499 U.S. 187 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's policy that excludes fertile women from certain jobs to protect a potential fetus from workplace hazards is explicit sex discrimination that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and can only be justified through the narrow bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, which does not include concern for fetal health.
Facts:
- Johnson Controls, Inc., a battery manufacturer, used lead as a primary ingredient in its production process.
- Occupational exposure to lead entails health risks, including potential harm to any fetus carried by a female employee.
- Initially, Johnson Controls had a policy of warning female employees of the risks and advising them against choosing lead-exposure jobs if they intended to have children.
- In 1982, after eight female employees became pregnant while having high blood-lead levels, Johnson Controls implemented a mandatory fetal-protection policy.
- The new policy excluded all women "capable of bearing children" from jobs involving specified levels of lead exposure.
- The policy defined "women capable of bearing children" as all women, regardless of age or marital status, except those with medical documentation of their inability to conceive.
- The policy did not apply to male employees, despite evidence that lead exposure could also pose risks to the male reproductive system.
- At least one female employee, Mary Craig, underwent sterilization to avoid losing her job under this policy.
Procedural Posture:
- The United Automobile Workers and several employees (petitioners) filed a class-action lawsuit against Johnson Controls, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
- The petitioners alleged that the company's fetal-protection policy constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Johnson Controls.
- Petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court's judgment for Johnson Controls.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.
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Issue:
Does an employer's policy that excludes all fertile women, but not fertile men, from jobs involving lead exposure, because of concern for the health of potential fetuses, constitute sex discrimination that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
Yes. An employer's policy that excludes fertile women from jobs because of concern for the health of potential fetuses is explicit sex discrimination under Title VII and is not defensible as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The policy is facially discriminatory because it does not apply to fertile men and classifies employees based on their capacity to become pregnant, which the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) explicitly defines as sex discrimination. As this is overt disparate treatment, the only available defense is the BFOQ, not the more lenient 'business necessity' standard. The BFOQ is an extremely narrow exception limited to qualifications that affect an employee's ability to perform the job and go to the 'essence of the business.' A woman's fertility does not interfere with her ability to manufacture batteries. While a BFOQ may allow for safety-based discrimination in some cases, it applies only to the safety of third parties essential to the employer's business, such as airline passengers or prison inmates; unconceived fetuses do not fall into this category. The decision regarding the welfare of future children must be left to the parents, not their employers.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes. While the policy is overt discrimination that must be justified as a BFOQ, the majority's interpretation of the BFOQ defense is too narrow and wrongly holds that it could never justify a sex-specific fetal-protection policy. A BFOQ defense can be broad enough to include considerations of avoiding substantial tort liability, as protecting third parties from harm is part of the 'normal operation' of a business. However, I concur in the judgment because Johnson Controls failed to meet its burden to establish a BFOQ on the summary judgment record. The policy was overly broad, and the company failed to present sufficient evidence that the policy was 'reasonably necessary' to its normal business operations, particularly since it operated without such a policy until 1982.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Yes. I concur in the judgment but disagree with aspects of the majority's reasoning. The evidence of lead's effect on male reproduction is irrelevant; the PDA makes discrimination based on pregnancy sex discrimination, period. It is also irrelevant whether all fertile women would be unable to perform the job safely, as Title VII gives women the power to make that choice. Further, I disagree with the majority's suggestion that increased costs short of threatening business survival cannot support a BFOQ defense. Johnson Controls loses here simply because it has not demonstrated a substantial risk of tort liability sufficient to establish a BFOQ.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly strengthened protections against sex discrimination in the workplace by classifying fetal-protection policies that target only women as facial discrimination, not as neutral policies with a disparate impact. By subjecting such policies to the stringent BFOQ analysis, the Court made them nearly impossible to justify. The ruling reinforces principles of individual autonomy, shifting the decision-making power regarding reproductive risks from the employer to the female employee. It also places a greater burden on employers to make workplaces safe for all employees rather than excluding a protected class from hazardous but higher-paying jobs.
