Auman v. People
2005 WL 713235, 109 P.3d 647 (2005)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A co-participant's arrest does not, as a matter of law, terminate liability for felony murder when another participant remains in immediate flight from the predicate felony, with the question of termination being a factual determination for the jury. However, an erroneous jury instruction on an essential mental state element of a predicate felony that undermines a defendant's defense and is not cured by overwhelming evidence constitutes plain error requiring reversal of both the predicate felony and the felony murder conviction.
Facts:
- Lisl Auman rented a room at an eleven-bedroom lodge and had been dating another tenant, Shawn Cheever, who ended their relationship and padlocked his room.
- Auman made plans to move out and asked her friends Demetria Soriano, Dion Gerze, Matthew Jaehnig, and Stephen Duprey to help retrieve her belongings, some of which were in Cheever's room, indicating she wanted the men as 'muscle' and was aware Gerze and Jaehnig carried guns.
- On November 12, 1997, Auman and her group drove to the Lodge in two cars, with Jaehnig carrying a shotgun and two assault rifles visible in his vehicle.
- Auman, Gerze, and Duprey broke the padlock to Cheever's room with bolt cutters provided by Jaehnig and removed Auman's belongings, as well as some of Cheever's property, while Jaehnig acted as a lookout and helped load items.
- Auman and Jaehnig fled in a Trans Am, leading law enforcement officers on a high-speed chase into Denver, during which Auman held the steering wheel while Jaehnig shot at one of the deputy's cars with an assault rifle.
- Upon reaching an apartment complex, Auman surrendered to police and was arrested, placed in a police car.
- Approximately five minutes after Auman's arrest, Denver police officer Bruce VanderJagt, searching for Jaehnig, was shot and killed at point-blank range by Jaehnig, who was still cornered in an alcove and armed with the assault rifle, after Auman had not informed police of Jaehnig's whereabouts or armaments despite repeated questioning.
Procedural Posture:
- Lisl Auman was charged with first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, menacing, first-degree burglary, and conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary in a Colorado trial court.
- At the preliminary hearing, the trial court found that the burglary, flight, and shooting were connected by a 'continuing sequence of events,' and concluded that immediate flight had not terminated upon Auman's arrest, allowing the felony murder charge to be submitted to the jury.
- At Auman's counsel's request, the trial court instructed the jury on second-degree burglary and first-degree criminal trespass as lesser included offenses to first-degree burglary.
- The jury acquitted Auman of first-degree burglary, attempted first-degree murder, and first-degree assault, but found her guilty of first-degree felony murder, second-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary, and menacing.
- Auman appealed her convictions to the Colorado Court of Appeals (appellant), arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in improperly instructing the jury on the required elements of second-degree burglary and theft, and that her arrest terminated felony-murder liability as a matter of law.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals (appellee) affirmed Auman's convictions for first-degree felony murder and second-degree burglary, holding that, as a matter of law, arrest does not terminate a co-participant's liability for felony murder while another participant remains in flight, and that the trial court properly left this issue to the jury.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an erroneous jury instruction regarding the 'knowingly' mental state for the 'without authorization' element of theft, which served as the predicate felony for second-degree burglary, constitute plain error requiring reversal of both the second-degree burglary and felony murder convictions, where the error undermined the defendant's defense and was not cured by overwhelming evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - BENDER, Justice.
Yes, an erroneous jury instruction regarding the 'knowingly' mental state for the 'without authorization' element of theft, which served as the predicate felony for second-degree burglary, does constitute plain error requiring reversal of both the second-degree burglary and felony murder convictions, because the error undermined Auman's defense and was not cured by overwhelming evidence. Additionally, a co-participant's arrest, by itself, does not, as a matter of law, terminate liability for felony murder when another participant remains in flight, leaving this as a jury question. The Colorado felony-murder statute (§ 18-3-102(1)(b)) is broad, imposing liability when a death occurs 'in the course of or in furtherance of' a predicate felony or 'of immediate flight therefrom,' regardless of intent to kill. The statute applies to those acting 'alone or with one or more persons' and when death is 'caused by anyone.' The plain language, as well as pre-code Colorado cases like Bizup v. People and People v. McCrary, and New York precedent (on which Colorado's statute was modeled), supports the principle that arrest alone does not, as a matter of law, terminate a co-participant's liability for felony murder while another participant remains in immediate flight; rather, this is a factual determination for the jury based on the unique circumstances of each case, including the temporal connection and causal relationship. Therefore, the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether Auman’s arrest terminated her liability. The majority found that the trial court's instruction on 'immediate flight' was not reversible error, despite not perfectly tracking statutory language, because the phrase 'in immediate flight therefrom' was substantially synonymous with 'in the course of immediate flight therefrom' and sufficiently conveyed the required causal connection. The court also held that the trial court did not err in declining to provide Auman's tendered supplemental instruction defining immediate flight or an intervening cause instruction, as Auman failed to present sufficient evidence for the latter and the alleged intervening causes existed prior to her unlawful acts. However, the theft instruction given to the jury, which was the predicate crime for second-degree burglary (which in turn was the predicate for felony murder), was erroneous. It failed to require the jury to find that Auman knowingly acted 'without authorization' when taking Cheever's property. This error was significant because Auman's defense centered on her intent: she claimed she only entered Cheever's room to retrieve her own belongings and did not intend to steal Cheever's property at the time of unlawful entry. The erroneous instruction allowed the jury to convict her of burglary even if they believed her defense. Since Auman's intent at the time of entry was a vigorously contested issue, and the evidence of her guilt for burglary with the proper intent was not overwhelming, the instructional error prevented a full and fair jury consideration of her defense. This constitutes plain error, casting serious doubt upon the reliability of the jury's verdict. Consequently, Auman's second-degree burglary conviction must be reversed, and because her felony-murder conviction was predicated upon it, that conviction must also be reversed, requiring a new trial.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - MULLARKEY, C.J.
No, the error in the theft instruction did not amount to plain error requiring reversal of Auman's convictions for second-degree burglary and felony murder. Chief Justice Mullarkey dissented from the reversal, arguing that because the defendant did not object to the jury instruction at trial, the error should be reviewed under the high standard of 'plain error,' which requires a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction, evaluated in the context of all jury instructions and the entire trial record. While agreeing that the theft instruction was erroneous for omitting 'knowingly' from the 'without authorization' element, she believed this error had little practical effect on the jury's determination because Auman knew Cheever had not authorized her to take his property (evidenced by the padlocked room and broken relationship). The concept of acting 'by deception' inherently requires knowledge. More importantly, the jury's verdicts demonstrated a careful differentiation among the charges, rejecting Auman's defense that she only committed criminal trespass (entering unlawfully without intent to steal) and instead convicting her of second-degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary. The conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary indicated the jury accepted the prosecution's theory that Auman and her co-conspirators agreed to break in and steal Cheever's property, and planned to use deadly force. This showed the jury understood and rejected Auman's specific defense regarding her intent at the time of entry. Therefore, the Chief Justice concluded that the jury was not misled, and the instruction error did not constitute plain error justifying reversal.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of felony murder liability in Colorado, especially concerning multi-participant felonies and the impact of an arrest on the 'immediate flight' element. It affirms that individual arrest does not automatically terminate felony murder liability if other participants are still fleeing, leaving this as a factual determination for the jury. Crucially, the ruling underscores the stringent requirement for accurate and complete jury instructions regarding all elements of predicate felonies, particularly the mental state. The reversal due to instructional error, even when not objected to at trial, highlights that fundamental fairness demands precise guidance to the jury on contested issues, reinforcing the strict scrutiny applied to errors affecting a defendant's primary defense and potentially requiring new trials for serious charges if these standards are not met.
