Augeri v. Planning & Zoning Commission
24 Conn. App. 172, 586 A.2d 635, 1991 Conn. App. LEXIS 54 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under a remedial statute allowing previously dismissed zoning appeals to be reopened, a case may not be reopened if it would cause a "substantial infringement of property rights," which occurs when a party has expended significant sums of money in good faith reliance on the finality of the prior dismissal.
Facts:
- The Middletown Planning & Zoning Commission granted Thaddeus Bysiewicz approval for a five-lot subdivision.
- The subdivision's approval was conditioned on Bysiewicz providing public water and sewer service to each of the five lots.
- After a court dismissed a legal challenge to the subdivision approval, Bysiewicz acted in reliance on that dismissal.
- During the period of reliance, Bysiewicz expended "thousands of dollars" to construct and supply the required water and sewer services for his approved subdivision.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, Augeri, appealed the Planning & Zoning Commission’s subdivision approval to the Superior Court (trial court).
- The trial court dismissed Augeri's appeal for a procedural defect.
- Augeri’s motion to open the judgment of dismissal was denied by the trial court.
- Augeri, as appellant, appealed the denial to the Appellate Court of Connecticut, which reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court in a prior decision.
- On remand, Augeri filed a petition to reopen the original dismissed appeal pursuant to a new law, Public Act 88-79.
- The trial court denied Augeri's petition, finding that reopening the judgment would substantially infringe upon the property rights of the developer, Thaddeus Bysiewicz.
- Augeri, as appellant, appealed the trial court's denial of the petition to reopen to the Appellate Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does a developer's expenditure of thousands of dollars on subdivision improvements, made in good faith reliance on a court's prior dismissal of a zoning appeal, constitute a "substantial infringement of property rights" under Public Act 88-79 sufficient to prevent the appeal from being reopened?
Opinions:
Majority - Landau, J.
Yes. The expenditure of significant sums of money in good faith reliance on a prior judgment constitutes a 'substantial infringement of property rights' under the act. The court found the statutory phrase 'a substantial infringement of property rights' to be ambiguous. By examining the legislative history, the court determined the legislature intended the phrase to address 'an economic detriment' and situations where 'significant sums of money' had been invested in good faith reliance on the prior court decision that the act was meant to remedy. Therefore, the existence of such an infringement is a factual determination to be made by the trial court on a case-by-case basis by evaluating the equities. Here, the trial court correctly found that Bysiewicz's expenditure of thousands of dollars was a substantial infringement that precluded the plaintiff from reopening the appeal.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the meaning of a key exception within a remedial statute, demonstrating that equitable considerations like financial reliance can override a legislatively granted right to reopen a case. It establishes that the term "substantial infringement of property rights" is not limited to a constitutional taking but also encompasses significant economic loss incurred in good faith. This precedent instructs lower courts to conduct a fact-specific, equitable inquiry when applying this type of statutory exception, balancing the public policy goal of correcting procedural errors against the need to protect vested economic interests.
