Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian
590 U.S. 1, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020)
Rule of Law:
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) does not strip state courts of jurisdiction over state common law claims for restoration damages at Superfund sites. However, property owners whose land is contaminated by hazardous substances are 'potentially responsible parties' (PRPs) under CERCLA and must obtain EPA approval before undertaking remedial actions on those sites, even if they are not liable for cleanup costs.
Facts:
- For nearly a century, from 1884 to 1973, the Anaconda Copper Smelter in Butte, Montana, contaminated an area exceeding 300 square miles with arsenic and lead.
- Atlantic Richfield Company purchased Anaconda Copper Mining Company in the 1970s and subsequently closed the Anaconda facility by 1980.
- In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated the over 300-square-mile area around the smelters as one of the inaugural Superfund sites.
- Since 1983, Atlantic Richfield has spent approximately $450 million implementing EPA's cleanup orders at the site, with remedial work projected to continue through 2025.
- A group of 98 landowners, whose properties are within the Superfund site, filed a lawsuit against Atlantic Richfield for common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability.
- The landowners sought restoration damages under Montana law, intending to use the funds to rehabilitate their properties.
- The landowners' proposed restoration plan includes measures beyond those in EPA's cleanup plan, such as a maximum soil arsenic level of 15 parts per million (compared to EPA's 250 ppm) and deeper excavation of soil (two feet compared to EPA's one foot), and a groundwater barrier that the EPA had rejected as costly and unnecessary.
- Many of the landowners purchased their properties after the smelter was built, and public knowledge of the contamination was widespread, with the Anaconda Company having previously obtained easements for smoke and tailings deposition on properties now owned by the landowners.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of 98 landowners sued Atlantic Richfield Company in Montana state trial court, asserting common law claims of trespass, nuisance, and strict liability, seeking restoration damages.
- In the trial court, Atlantic Richfield and the landowners filed competing motions for summary judgment on whether CERCLA precluded the landowners' claim for restoration damages.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowners on that issue, allowing their lawsuit to continue.
- Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court (the highest court in the state, acting as an intermediate appellate court for this purpose).
- The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting Atlantic Richfield's arguments that CERCLA stripped state courts of jurisdiction and that the landowners were 'potentially responsible parties' prohibited from taking remedial action without EPA approval.
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Issue:
1. Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) strip state courts of jurisdiction over state common law claims for restoration damages at a Superfund site? 2. Does CERCLA require landowners, who are considered 'potentially responsible parties' due to hazardous substances on their property but are not responsible for the contamination, to seek EPA approval for a proposed restoration plan that goes beyond the EPA's own cleanup plan?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No, CERCLA does not strip Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners' state common law claims for restoration damages. Section 113(b) grants federal district courts exclusive original jurisdiction only over claims "arising under" CERCLA, which refers to claims where CERCLA itself creates the cause of action. The landowners' claims for nuisance, trespass, and strict liability arise under Montana state law, not CERCLA, therefore state courts retain jurisdiction. The Court rejects Atlantic Richfield’s argument that Section 113(h) implicitly expands federal preclusion of state court jurisdiction, noting that § 113(h) explicitly addresses "Federal courts" and that there is a strong presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction over state law claims. Yes, CERCLA does require these landowners to seek EPA approval for their proposed restoration plan. The Montana Supreme Court erred in concluding that the landowners were not "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) under CERCLA § 122(e)(6). The definition of a PRP is tied to the "covered persons" in § 107(a), which includes any "owner" of a "facility" where hazardous substances have "come to be located." Since arsenic and lead are hazardous substances on the landowners' properties, they are PRPs. The Court clarifies that PRP status is distinct from liability for cleanup costs; even if the statute of limitations for recovery has run, or if EPA has a non-enforcement policy, one can still be a PRP. Section 122(e)(6) is a crucial tool within the Act's settlement framework to ensure a single, coordinated cleanup effort. The landowners also do not qualify for the "contiguous property owner" defense under § 107(q)(1)(A) because they did not establish that they were unaware of the contamination when they acquired their property, and their proposed plan would interfere with EPA’s cleanup, violating cooperation requirements.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Alito
I agree with the Court that it has jurisdiction to hear this case and that the landowners are 'potentially responsible parties' under CERCLA § 122(e)(6), meaning they cannot undertake their restoration plan without EPA approval. However, I disagree with the Court's decision to rule on whether state courts have jurisdiction to entertain "challenges" to EPA-approved CERCLA plans (Part II-B of the majority opinion). I believe deciding this jurisdictional question is unnecessary and imprudent because the case will likely be resolved on remand without needing to reach this complex issue. If EPA disapproves the landowners' plan, the case might end there. The statutory provisions governing this jurisdictional question (§§ 113(b) and (h)) are "devilishly difficult" to interpret, and the Court's current interpretation of "arising under" in § 113(b) creates internal inconsistencies, such as rendering language about "citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy" meaningless.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Gorsuch
I agree with the Court that it has jurisdiction to hear this case. However, I disagree with the Court's ruling that the landowners are 'potentially responsible parties' (PRPs) under CERCLA § 122(e)(6) and must seek EPA approval for their cleanup plans. CERCLA's numerous "saving clauses" explicitly state that the Act supplements, rather than supplants, state common law remedies and does not preempt additional state liability or requirements. Section 122(e)(6) refers to "potentially responsible parties," which, in its ordinary meaning and statutory context, should apply only to those who are actually susceptible to federal liability and involved in settlement negotiations. The landowners here were never notified as PRPs by the government, and the statute of limitations for any federal claim against them has expired, so they are not "potentially responsible" to the federal government for anything. Confusing "potentially responsible party" in § 122 with "covered persons" in § 107 (who are merely those the government could sue) ignores clear linguistic and logical distinctions in the statute and would effectively nullify CERCLA's saving clauses. Such an interpretation imposes a federal easement on private lands, forcing innocent landowners to host toxic waste indefinitely and raising serious constitutional concerns under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and the Commerce Clause. Congress intended a system of cooperative federalism, and if private efforts interfered with federal ones, Congress authorized injunctive relief, not a blanket prohibition on state-law cleanups.
Analysis:
This landmark decision provides crucial clarification regarding the interplay between federal environmental law and state common law claims at Superfund sites. It reinforces the principle that while CERCLA establishes a federal cleanup framework, it generally does not preempt state common law causes of action. However, the ruling significantly expands the scope of who constitutes a 'potentially responsible party' (PRP) under CERCLA, requiring even innocent landowners whose property contains hazardous substances to obtain EPA approval before undertaking their own 'remedial actions.' This creates a clear federal oversight mechanism for private cleanup efforts at Superfund sites, aiming to prevent conflicting or counterproductive remediation activities, while still allowing state common law remedies to proceed under specific conditions. Future cases will likely focus on what specific activities constitute 'remedial action' requiring EPA approval and the process for obtaining such approval.
