Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon
473 U.S. 234 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
For Congress to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute itself; a state's acceptance of federal funds does not constitute an implied waiver of this immunity.
Facts:
- Douglas James Scanlon has diabetes mellitus and is without sight in one eye.
- Atascadero State Hospital is a California state facility operated by the California Department of Mental Health.
- The hospital is a recipient of federal financial assistance under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
- In 1978, Scanlon applied for a position as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist at the hospital.
- Atascadero State Hospital denied Scanlon's application for employment.
- Scanlon alleged that the hospital refused to hire him solely because of his physical handicaps.
Procedural Posture:
- Douglas James Scanlon sued Atascadero State Hospital and the California Department of Mental Health in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
- The District Court (trial court) dismissed the complaint, ruling that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
- Scanlon, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that Scanlon had failed to state a key element of his claim.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of a recent precedent.
- On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal, holding that the state had implicitly consented to suit by accepting federal funds.
- The Atascadero State Hospital, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state's acceptance of funds under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or the general statutory language authorizing suits against 'any recipient of Federal assistance,' constitute a waiver of or congressional abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. Neither the language of the Rehabilitation Act nor California's participation in programs funded by it is sufficient to overcome the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment establishes a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity that limits the federal judicial power. This immunity can only be overcome in two ways: explicit congressional abrogation or unequivocal state waiver. First, for Congress to abrogate state immunity when acting pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must express its intention to do so in 'unmistakable language in the statute itself.' The Rehabilitation Act's general authorization of suits against 'any recipient of Federal assistance' is not the kind of specific language required to abrogate the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the states. Second, a state's waiver must be explicit and specific to federal-court jurisdiction. California's constitutional provision allowing suits against the state is a general waiver and does not specify an intent to be sued in federal court. Furthermore, a state's mere receipt of federal funds and participation in a federal program cannot be construed as a constructive waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine is based on flawed history and imposes an unjustifiable barrier to the enforcement of federal law against states. The language and legislative history of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act demonstrate a clear congressional intent to subject states to suit. The phrase 'any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance' was patterned after identical language in Title VI and Title IX, which was universally understood to include states. The majority's creation of a super-strict 'clear statement' rule serves only to obstruct the will of Congress and exempt states from laws that bind all other actors. A proper historical analysis reveals the Eleventh Amendment was only intended to reverse the specific outcome of Chisholm v. Georgia by barring state-law diversity suits against states, not to establish a broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity against federal-question claims.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The majority's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence springs from the same flawed reasoning regarding principles of federalism that the Court recently abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. The prevailing construction of the Eleventh Amendment as a broad shield of sovereign immunity cannot be reconciled with the federal system envisioned by the Constitution. Furthermore, California, by willingly accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, consented to suit. Congress also validly abrogated the states' immunity in the Act pursuant to its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. While previously adhering to precedent like Edelman v. Jordan out of respect for stare decisis, it is now clear that both Edelman and the foundational case of Hans v. Louisiana were 'egregiously incorrect.' The Court's recent willingness to disregard stare decisis in expanding sovereign immunity justifies a fresh examination of the entire doctrine. The benefits of correcting this flawed jurisprudence far outweigh the consequences of unraveling the doctrine in this area.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing the modern, strict 'clear statement rule' for congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court's holding that Congress's intent must be 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute itself' created a high procedural bar for legislation intended to hold states accountable in federal court. This decision effectively ended the theory of 'constructive waiver,' whereby a state could be deemed to have consented to suit merely by participating in a federal spending program. Following this case, Congress had to draft statutes with highly specific language explicitly mentioning states and their amenability to suit in federal court to successfully abrogate immunity, significantly impacting the drafting and enforcement of civil rights legislation against state governments.
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