No, the lawsuit isn't good enough to move forward. Just because the companies acted alike doesn't prove they agreed to do so. It's equally possible that each company, on its own, decided it was smart business to block competitors. A lawsuit needs to be more than just a guess; it has to be believable. Since the complaint doesn't have any extra facts that point to an actual agreement, it gets dismissed. We are getting rid of the old, super-lenient rule that let almost any lawsuit proceed, to prevent companies from being dragged into super expensive legal battles based on weak claims.

Yes, the lawsuit should continue. The court is changing the rules and making it too hard to sue. The lawsuit literally says the companies 'entered into a contract... or conspiracy.' At this early stage, the judge is supposed to assume that's true. It's not the judge's job right now to decide if the story is believable—that's what the rest of the lawsuit process is for. This new rule will let powerful companies get away with breaking the law because no one will be able to sue them without already having inside information, which is almost impossible to get.

It's not enough to just say companies acted similarly and claim they made an illegal agreement. You need to give enough facts to make it seem like they plausibly could have made an actual agreement. Just saying they did something wrong without more details isn't enough. Since the people suing here didn't give good enough facts to make their claim of an agreement seem possible, rather than just imaginary, their case has to be dismissed.

The Court's new rule doesn't fit with our normal standards. Usually people suing just have to give a simple statement of their claim to go forward. The majority is too worried about the hassle of lawsuits, but that's not a good reason to change the rules. If what the people suing are saying is true, the companies broke the law. They should at least have to respond to the claim that they agreed not to compete before the case gets thrown out. The people suing should get a chance to look for evidence first.

Yes, plaintiffs need to give specific facts suggesting an actual agreement when suing companies for anti-competitive behavior; it's not enough to just say the companies acted similarly. Plaintiffs need to give enough facts to make it seem like the companies plausibly could have made an actual agreement. Just saying the companies did something wrong without more details isn't enough. Since the people suing here didn't give good enough facts to make their claim of an agreement seem possible, rather than just imaginary, their case has to be dismissed.

No, people suing do not need to give specific facts suggesting an actual agreement; usually, they just have to give a simple statement of their claim to go forward. The Court's new rule doesn't fit with our normal standards. The majority is too worried about the hassle of lawsuits, but that's not a good reason to change the rules. If what the people suing are saying is true, the companies broke the law. The companies should at least have to respond to the claim that they agreed not to compete before the case gets thrown out. The people suing should get a chance to look for evidence first.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"

But a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true

"The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.... When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id

Rule 8 (a)(2) "requires only `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"

No. A complaint alleging only parallel conduct without further factual enhancement does not state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter to suggest that an agreement was made, moving the claim from merely conceivable to plausible. The Court explicitly retired the 'no set of facts' standard from Conley v. Gibson, which it deemed an incomplete gloss on pleading standards. Here, the alleged parallel conduct—both resisting CLECs and refraining from competing with each other—is just as consistent with rational, independent business strategy as it is with an illegal conspiracy. Each ILEC had a powerful unilateral incentive to protect its own territory, making an agreement unnecessary to explain their behavior. To allow such a complaint to proceed would subject defendants to potentially massive and expensive antitrust discovery based on mere speculation, which the plausibility standard is designed to prevent.

Yes. The complaint should be allowed to proceed. The majority's new 'plausibility' standard is a dramatic and unwarranted departure from the well-established notice pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, as articulated in Conley v. Gibson. The complaint does not merely allege parallel conduct; it makes the straightforward allegation that the ILECs 'entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy.' At the motion-to-dismiss stage, this factual allegation must be accepted as true. The majority improperly dismisses this as a 'legal conclusion' and engages in its own appraisal of the facts, which is a task for summary judgment or trial, not for a ruling on the pleadings. This decision creates a heightened pleading burden that will prevent meritorious antitrust cases, where proof is often in the hands of the defendants, from ever reaching the discovery phase.

The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Mere allegations of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy without factual enhancement are insufficient. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, and the complaint must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice to meet this standard. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.

The Court's plausibility standard is irreconcilable with Rule 8 and the Court's governing precedents. Under notice pleading, all that is required is a short and plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief. The majority's concern about the burdens of discovery does not justify a judicial revision of the Federal Rules. The allegations of parallel conduct and agreement, if true, describe unlawful conduct under the Sherman Act. The complaint should not be dismissed without requiring the defendants to answer the charge that they agreed not to compete with one another. At the very least, the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to conduct limited discovery on the alleged conspiracy before dismissing the case.

Yes, a complaint alleging parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act must contain specific factual allegations suggesting an agreement to survive a motion to dismiss. The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Mere allegations of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy without factual enhancement are insufficient. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, and the complaint must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice to meet this standard. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.

No, a complaint alleging parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not need to contain specific factual allegations suggesting an agreement to survive a motion to dismiss. Under notice pleading, all that is required is a short and plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief. The Court's plausibility standard is irreconcilable with Rule 8 and the Court's governing precedents. The majority's concern about the burdens of discovery does not justify a judicial revision of the Federal Rules. The allegations of parallel conduct and agreement, if true, describe unlawful conduct under the Sherman Act. The complaint should not be dismissed without requiring the defendants to answer the charge that they agreed not to compete with one another. At the very least, the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to conduct limited discovery on the alleged conspiracy before dismissing the case.

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly

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