Association for Retarded Citizens-Volusia, Inc. v. Fletcher
741 So. 2d 520 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
An initial tortfeasor whose negligence causes an injury is liable for all subsequent damages, including the aggravation of the initial injury by negligent medical treatment, and cannot apportion fault to the subsequent medical providers under Florida's comparative fault statute.
Facts:
- Nathan Wiley, a seventeen-year-old with a severe developmental disability and a history of grand mal seizures, attended a summer camp operated by the Association for Retarded Citizens-Volusia, Inc. (ARC).
- Nathan's mother, Sandra Fletcher, disclosed his seizure disorder on the camp application form.
- ARC failed to inform Nathan's assigned camp counselor or the pool lifeguards of his medical condition.
- During a supervised swimming period, Nathan's counselor left him unattended in the shallow end of the pool to swim to the deep end.
- While unsupervised, Nathan went into the deep end, apparently suffered a seizure, and was found face down, having aspirated a significant amount of water.
- He was resuscitated at the poolside and transported to Halifax Medical Center for treatment.
- Nine days after the incident, Nathan died from Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) caused by the water aspiration.
Procedural Posture:
- Sandra Fletcher, on behalf of Nathan Wiley's estate, filed a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against the Association for Retarded Citizens-Volusia, Inc. (ARC) in a Florida trial court.
- ARC answered the complaint and asserted an affirmative defense that subsequent negligent medical care was the cause of Nathan's death.
- Fletcher filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to strike ARC's affirmative defense.
- The trial court granted Fletcher's motion, thereby prohibiting ARC from arguing to the jury that medical providers were at fault for Nathan's death.
- A jury trial was held, resulting in a verdict and damages awarded to Fletcher.
- ARC's post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied by the trial court.
- ARC, as Appellant, appealed the final judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, where Fletcher was the Appellee.
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Issue:
Does section 768.81, Florida Statutes, which allocates fault on a percentage basis, permit an initial tortfeasor to apportion fault to subsequent medical providers whose alleged negligence aggravated the plaintiff's original injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Antoon, J.
No. Section 768.81 does not abrogate the common law rule that an initial tortfeasor is responsible for all subsequent injuries, including those caused by negligent medical care. The court held that while ARC's proffer of evidence of medical negligence was insufficient on its own, the underlying legal argument also fails. The court reasoned that Florida's comparative fault statute, section 768.81, was intended to apportion fault among tortfeasors who contributed to the plaintiff's initial accident or injury, not to subsequent, independent acts of negligence that aggravate the injury. Citing Stuart v. Hertz Corp., the court affirmed that a subsequent medical provider is not a joint tortfeasor with the initial wrongdoer. The legislature did not explicitly state an intent to overturn this well-settled common law principle, and policy considerations weigh against turning personal injury cases into complex medical malpractice actions at the behest of the original defendant.
Dissenting - Harris, J.
Yes. The comparative fault statute should permit an initial tortfeasor to apportion fault to subsequent negligent medical providers. The dissent argued that the public policy behind section 768.81 is to hold a party responsible only for its proportionate share of fault, a policy that should apply to both simultaneous and successive acts of negligence that contribute to a single ultimate injury, such as death. The dissent contended that the initial tortfeasor and the negligent medical provider are joint tortfeasors with respect to the damages caused by the malpractice, making apportionment appropriate. Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority for upholding the summary judgment based on an insufficient proffer of evidence, arguing that at the summary judgment stage, the burden was on the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's affirmative defense, not on the defendant to prove it.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and preserves the traditional common law rule of proximate cause regarding subsequent medical aggravation in Florida, despite the state's adoption of a comparative fault system. It clarifies that the comparative fault statute applies only to apportioning liability among those who caused the initial injury, not to those who subsequently aggravate it. The ruling prevents initial tortfeasors from deflecting liability onto medical providers, which in turn protects plaintiffs from being forced to litigate complex medical malpractice claims within their primary negligence lawsuit. This maintains a bright-line rule that simplifies litigation and holds original wrongdoers fully accountable for all foreseeable consequences of their actions.
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