Arthur W. Beauregard v. Charles E. (Rex) Gouin
66 A.3d 489 (2013)
Rule of Law:
Filing a statutory notice of intent to dispute potential adverse possession claims, which only makes claims regarding the filer's own property, does not constitute slander of title or intentional interference with another's prospective advantage because it does not contain a false statement about the other's property and is not an improper act.
Facts:
- Arthur W. Beauregard owned an undeveloped parcel of land on a private right of way called Umbrella Way.
- His neighbors, including Charles E. Gouin and John Somyk (the codefendants), owned adjacent parcels and also collectively owned Umbrella Way itself.
- In late 2002, Beauregard met with some of the codefendants and stated that he would 'need some of [their] property' to build a house on his lot.
- Concerned about potential adverse possession claims by Beauregard to their private road, the codefendants hired Attorney Paul A. Brule.
- On July 29, 2004, on behalf of the codefendants, Attorney Brule filed a 'Notice of Intent' in the town's land records pursuant to a state statute.
- The notice was addressed to Beauregard and stated the codefendants' intent 'to dispute any right arising from your use of any part of the land which is of record owned by us.'
Procedural Posture:
- Arthur W. Beauregard initially filed a complaint against his neighbors (the codefendants) in the Rhode Island Superior Court (trial court).
- Beauregard later amended his complaint to add the codefendants' legal counsel, Attorney Paul A. Brule and his law firm (the attorney defendants), as parties.
- The amended complaint set forth claims against the attorney defendants for slander of title and intentional interference with prospective advantage.
- The attorney defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The Superior Court motion justice granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants, finding they acted without malice and that the notice did not slander Beauregard's title.
- The court entered a final judgment for the attorney defendants.
- Beauregard (appellant) filed a timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, where the attorney defendants are the appellees.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the filing of a statutory notice of intent to prevent adverse possession on one's own property give rise to a claim for slander of title or intentional interference with prospective advantage by the notice's recipient, even if the notice has a collateral negative effect on the recipient's ability to develop their separate property?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Robinson
No. The filing of a statutory notice of intent that accurately asserts rights to one's own property does not give rise to claims for slander of title or intentional interference with prospective advantage. A claim for slander of title requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant published a false statement about the plaintiff's ownership of real estate. Here, the notice contained no statement—false or otherwise—about Mr. Beauregard's property; it explicitly and exclusively referred to 'the land which is of record owned by us [the codefendants].' The fact that third parties like a title insurer or lender may have misinterpreted the notice and caused harm to Beauregard does not change the fact that an essential element of his claim, a false statement, is missing. Similarly, a claim for intentional interference requires an 'improper act of interference.' Attorney Brule's filing was not improper; he employed a statutory procedure specifically provided by the legislature for landowners to protect their property rights. A good-faith assertion of a colorable property interest through appropriate means is a privileged act and constitutes a defense to such a claim.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of liability for attorneys and property owners who use statutory mechanisms to protect their property rights from claims like adverse possession. It reinforces the strict requirement for slander of title that a statement must be false and specifically about the plaintiff's property, not just have a collateral negative impact on it. By deeming the good-faith assertion of a property interest a 'privileged' act, the court protects landowners' ability to use established legal tools without fear of tort liability for unintended consequences, thereby encouraging the clear and early resolution of potential property disputes.
Gunnerbot
AI-powered case assistant
Loaded: Arthur W. Beauregard v. Charles E. (Rex) Gouin (2013)
Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"