Arrocha v. Board of Education
712 N.E.2d 669, 690 N.Y.S.2d 503, 93 N.Y.2d 361 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An administrative agency's decision to deny a license to an applicant with a prior criminal conviction will not be disturbed by a court if it has a rational basis. Under New York Correction Law Article 23-A, an agency may deny a license by finding an unreasonable risk, even if the applicant has a presumption of rehabilitation, by giving greater weight to the nature and seriousness of the prior offense than to subsequent evidence of good conduct.
Facts:
- In 1987, at the age of 36, petitioner was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance, a B felony, for selling a $10 bag of cocaine to an undercover officer.
- Following his conviction, petitioner served the minimum of a two-to-six-year prison term.
- In 1996, petitioner applied to the Board of Education of the City of New York for a certificate to teach high school Spanish.
- In his application, petitioner disclosed his prior felony conviction.
- To demonstrate his rehabilitation, petitioner submitted a certificate of relief from disabilities, five current letters of recommendation, and evidence of educational achievements he had made during and after his incarceration.
- The Board of Education denied his application, concluding that his conviction was serious in nature and that granting him employment would pose a risk to the safety and welfare of students and staff.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the New York Supreme Court (trial court) to challenge the Board of Education's denial of his license.
- The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the Board to grant the license.
- The Board of Education, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, with two justices dissenting.
- The Board of Education appealed as of right to the Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a board of education's denial of a teaching license to an applicant with a nine-year-old felony drug conviction violate New York Correction Law Article 23-A and constitute an arbitrary and capricious action, when the applicant has presented evidence of rehabilitation, including a certificate of relief from disabilities?
Opinions:
Majority - Levine, J.
No. The Board of Education's denial of the teaching license does not violate New York Correction Law and is not an arbitrary and capricious action because the Board had a rational basis for its decision. Judicial review of an administrative agency's discretionary act is limited to determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious, meaning it lacked a rational basis. New York Correction Law § 752 prohibits license denial based on a prior conviction unless an exception applies, such as when granting the license would create an 'unreasonable risk' to public safety or welfare. To determine if an unreasonable risk exists, the agency must consider the eight factors listed in Correction Law § 753. While the petitioner's certificate of relief from disabilities created a statutory presumption of rehabilitation (factor 'g'), this is only one of the eight factors. The Board was entitled to weigh the other factors—such as the seriousness of the B felony, the petitioner's mature age of 36 at the time of the offense, and the special responsibility of teachers as role models—more heavily than the evidence of rehabilitation. The Board was not required to rebut the presumption of rehabilitation and could properly find that the nature and seriousness of the crime were of 'overriding significance.' Because the Board considered all statutory factors and did not act irrationally, the court cannot substitute its own judgment by re-weighing the factors.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the significant deference courts afford to administrative agencies, particularly in licensing decisions that implicate public safety and welfare. It clarifies that under New York's anti-discrimination statute for ex-offenders, a presumption of rehabilitation is not dispositive and does not prevent an agency from denying a license based on other statutory factors. The ruling establishes that the seriousness of the underlying offense can be given 'overriding significance,' empowering agencies to deny licensure for sensitive positions even in the face of substantial evidence of an applicant's rehabilitation. This precedent sets a high bar for judicial reversal of such agency determinations, limiting challenges to instances where an agency's reasoning is wholly irrational.
