Armstrong v. Manzo
380 U.S. 545 (1965)
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Rule of Law:
The failure to provide a natural parent with notice of an adoption proceeding that seeks to terminate their parental rights is a violation of the Due Process Clause, and this constitutional defect is not cured by a subsequent hearing where the burden of proof is shifted to the parent to overcome the already-entered decree.
Facts:
- R. Wright Armstrong, Jr., and his wife divorced in 1959, with custody of their daughter, Molly, awarded to the mother and Armstrong ordered to pay child support.
- In 1960, Molly's mother married Salvatore E. Manzo.
- In 1962, the Manzos decided to have Salvatore Manzo adopt Molly.
- Under Texas law, a natural father's consent for adoption could be waived if he failed to contribute substantially to the child's support for two years.
- Knowing Armstrong's location, Mrs. Manzo filed an affidavit in a juvenile court alleging he had failed to provide support, without giving Armstrong any notice.
- Based solely on the affidavit, a juvenile court judge issued consent for the adoption, waiving the need for Armstrong's consent.
- The Manzos then filed an adoption petition in the District Court, again without notifying Armstrong, and the court entered an adoption decree terminating Armstrong's parental rights.
- Armstrong learned of the adoption only after the decree was entered, when Salvatore Manzo informed Armstrong's father.
Procedural Posture:
- Salvatore and Mrs. Manzo filed a petition for adoption in the District Court of El Paso County, Texas.
- The Texas District Court entered an adoption decree without providing notice to the natural father, R. Wright Armstrong, Jr.
- Armstrong filed a motion in the District Court to set aside the adoption decree.
- After a hearing on the motion, the District Court denied it and confirmed the adoption decree.
- Armstrong, as appellant, appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of Texas refused Armstrong's application for writ of error.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
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Issue:
Does a subsequent hearing on a motion to set aside an adoption decree, which was initially entered without notice to the natural father, cure the initial violation of the father's due process rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
No. A subsequent hearing on a motion to set aside an adoption decree does not cure the initial violation of due process rights when the decree was entered without notice to the natural father. The initial failure to provide notice violated the most rudimentary demands of due process, as a parent cannot be deprived of their parental rights without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The subsequent hearing was constitutionally inadequate because it improperly shifted the burden of proof. Had Armstrong received timely notice, the Manzos, as the moving parties, would have had the burden of proving that Armstrong's consent was not required. Instead, the post-decree hearing forced Armstrong into the position of having to overcome an adverse decree by affirmatively proving he had met his support obligations. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, which in this case would have required setting aside the decree and hearing the case anew, thereby restoring the proper allocation of the burden of proof.
Analysis:
This case firmly establishes that a post-deprivation hearing cannot cure a pre-deprivation due process violation if the subsequent hearing fundamentally alters the parties' legal positions, particularly the burden of proof. It underscores that the 'opportunity to be heard' must be meaningful, which includes proper timing before rights are adjudicated and a fair procedural framework. This precedent is critical in cases involving the termination of fundamental rights, like parental rights, ensuring that procedural shortcuts cannot be remedied by subsequent hearings that place the aggrieved party at a significant legal disadvantage.
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