Armstrong v. H & C COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 1401, 575 So. 2d 280, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1845 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
While broadcasting gruesome images of human remains may support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) if the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous, it does not necessarily constitute an invasion of privacy if the subject matter is already a matter of legitimate public concern.
Facts:
- In June 1985, Robert and Donna Armstrong's six-year-old child, Regina Mae Armstrong, was abducted from Orlando, Florida.
- In September 1987, a construction worker in Oviedo, Florida discovered a sun dress matching Regina Mae's description and a child's skull.
- In July 1988, some ten months after the discovery, the Oviedo Police Department finally connected the remains to Regina Mae, notifying the Orlando Police and the Armstrongs.
- On August 2, 1988, a memorial service was held for Regina Mae Armstrong.
- On that same day, Channel 2 reporter Michelle Meredith asked the Oviedo police chief to display Regina Mae's skull and then staged its removal from a box for a close-up videotape.
- Channel 2's 6:00 p.m. news producer, Carolyn Reitz, and anchor Steve Rondinaro argued against broadcasting the skull footage, but news director Steve Ramsey overruled them, stating, 'Fuck it! We are going to run it.'
- The close-up footage of Regina Mae's skull was broadcast live on Channel 2's 6:00 p.m. news throughout Central Florida without any prior review or editing by station personnel and without warning the Armstrong family.
- The broadcast included emotional segments about Regina Mae and her family, followed by the cameraman cutting directly to the Oviedo Police Chief removing her skull from a box, zooming in for a frontal close-up, with audio identifying the skull as Regina Mae Armstrong's.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert and Donna Armstrong, et al. (plaintiffs), filed a first amended complaint against H & C Communications, Inc., D/B/a Channel 2 (defendant), alleging invasion of privacy (Count I) and outrage (Count II).
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint with prejudice.
- The Armstrongs (appellants) appealed the trial court's dismissal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
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Issue:
Does a television station's broadcast of close-up footage of a deceased child's skull, obtained from police, constitute the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, despite the general public interest in the child's death and investigation?
Opinions:
Majority - Cobb
Yes, the complaint sufficiently alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage), but no, it did not adequately state a claim for invasion of privacy. The court concluded that reasonable persons in the community could find Channel 2's alleged conduct 'outrageous in character and exceeded the bounds of decency so as to be intolerable in a civilized community,' citing the definition of outrage from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson. The alleged facts, including the intentional broadcast of a gruesome close-up of a child's skull for sensationalism, the internal dissent at the station, and the acknowledged lack of newsworthiness and potential for outrage, strongly support this claim. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, distinguishing it from the tort of outrage. It noted that the Armstrongs were already in the public limelight due to Regina Mae's abduction and murder, making the discovery of her remains and their possession by the police legitimate matters of public interest. The court stated that 'the fact that the Oviedo police were in possession of the skull was not protected from public disclosure by any privacy rights of the Armstrongs' and that the disclosure did not fit into the four general categories of invasion of privacy recognized by Prosser because the facts were not private. The court also distinguished Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, emphasizing that the facts in that case (birth of a malformed child) were private, unlike the public interest surrounding Regina Mae's death.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - W. Sharp
Yes, the complaint sufficiently alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) and also stated a valid cause of action for invasion of privacy. Judge Sharp concurred with the majority that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was sufficiently pled. However, he dissented from the dismissal of the invasion of privacy count, arguing that parents do have a right of privacy action for the unwarranted and outrageous publication of pictures of their deceased child's body or body parts. He cited Douglas v. Stokes and Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital as supporting this position, emphasizing the profound emotional attachment and 'tender affections' people have for the bodies of their deceased children. He noted that while many cases involving mishandling remains are brought under intentional infliction of emotional distress, no Florida case explicitly forecloses a privacy action for parents in such circumstances. He concluded that the parents and sister stated a valid cause of action for invasion of their right of privacy regarding the 'lugubriously videotaped and televised' skull.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinct boundaries between the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) and invasion of privacy in Florida, particularly in the context of media reporting on matters of public interest. It establishes a high bar for invasion of privacy claims when the subject matter is already public, even if the manner of disclosure is highly offensive. Conversely, it reaffirms that extremely offensive media conduct, even regarding public events, can still rise to the level of "outrageous" and actionable emotional distress, emphasizing that newsworthiness does not provide a blanket shield against all forms of extreme conduct. The dissenting opinion highlights a potential gap in Florida's privacy law regarding deceased individuals and their families, suggesting a "relational" privacy right might be appropriate in such egregious circumstances.
