Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy
165 L. Ed. 2d 526, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162, 126 S.Ct. 2455 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
The fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), which authorizes courts to award 'reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs' to prevailing parents, does not permit the recovery of fees for expert witnesses or consultants.
Facts:
- Pearl and Theodore Murphy are the parents of Joseph Murphy, a child with a disability.
- A dispute arose between the Murphys and the Arlington Central School District Board of Education concerning the provision of a free appropriate public education for their son.
- The Murphys sought to require the school district to pay for their son's private school tuition.
- To assist them in their administrative and legal proceedings against the school district, the Murphys hired and utilized the services of an educational consultant, Marilyn Arons.
Procedural Posture:
- Pearl and Theodore Murphy filed an action under the IDEA against the Arlington Central School District Board of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The District Court ruled for the Murphys on the merits of their claim.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision on the merits.
- The Murphys, as the prevailing party, then filed a motion in the District Court to recover fees paid to their educational consultant.
- The District Court granted the motion in part, awarding the Murphys $8,650 in expert fees.
- The Arlington Central School District, as appellant, appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the Murphys as appellees.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the award of expert fees.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), which allows courts to award 'reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs' to prevailing parents, authorize the recovery of expert fees?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No, the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA does not authorize the recovery of expert fees. The statute’s authorization to award 'reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs' does not extend to fees for expert services. First, because the IDEA is Spending Clause legislation, any conditions placed on states accepting federal funds, such as liability for costs, must be stated unambiguously. The statute’s text provides no such clear notice that states would be liable for expert fees. Second, the term 'costs' is a legal term of art that does not generally include expert fees, and the statute’s language merely adds attorneys' fees to the list of traditional costs recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which does not include expert fees. Third, this holding is compelled by precedent, particularly West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, which interpreted virtually identical statutory language as not authorizing expert fee awards. The legislative history suggesting a contrary intent is insufficient to overcome the statute's unambiguous text in a Spending Clause case.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
No. While I agree that the IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees, the Court's reliance on a Spending Clause 'clear notice' requirement is unwarranted in this context, as this case concerns remedies, not core programmatic obligations. The judgment rests securely on two other pillars: the plain text of the statute, which contains specific provisions regulating attorneys' fees but is silent on expert fees, and our controlling precedents in Crawford Fitting and Casey. Congress has explicitly authorized expert fees in other statutes when it so intended, and its failure to do so here means that such fees are not recoverable under the IDEA. The legislative history cannot rewrite the unambiguous statutory text adopted by Congress.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The statutory phrase 'attorneys’ fees as part of the costs' should be interpreted to include expert fees. First, the legislative history, specifically the Conference Report, explicitly states that the conferees intended the phrase to include the reasonable fees of expert witnesses. Second, this interpretation furthers the IDEA's core purpose of ensuring a 'free appropriate public education,' which is undermined if parents cannot afford the necessary experts to vindicate their children's rights. Third, the statute's language is ambiguous, and other parts of the enacting legislation, like the mandate for a GAO study on the costs of 'consultants,' indicate Congress contemplated that such fees would be recoverable. The majority's rigid application of a 'clear notice' rule is inappropriate for a remedial detail of the statutory scheme and ignores Congress's clear intent.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. I join Justice Breyer's dissent and write separately to emphasize the significance of the provision in the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 that mandated a GAO study. That statutory provision, which specifically referenced consultants, makes Justice Breyer's reliance on the related Conference Report a reasonable and proper course of interpretation.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a strict, textualist approach to interpreting federal fee-shifting statutes, prioritizing the plain meaning of the text over legislative history and policy arguments. It establishes that unless Congress explicitly includes language authorizing expert fees, courts will not infer such a right. The ruling reinforces the precedent set in West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, applying its logic to the IDEA and creating a consistent, though narrow, interpretation of statutes that award 'attorneys' fees as part of the costs.' This creates a significant financial barrier for parents in IDEA litigation, potentially limiting their ability to effectively challenge school districts by making it harder to afford necessary expert testimony.
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