Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Schell
13 Ark. App. 293, 1985 Ark. App. LEXIS 1759, 683 S.W.2d 618 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, an expert witness must be permitted to disclose the underlying facts or data that form the basis of their opinion, even if that information constitutes hearsay, provided it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field.
Facts:
- Harold D. and Bertha E. Schell owned a forty-acre tract of land on which they operated a poultry business with four poultry houses.
- The Arkansas State Highway Commission initiated eminent domain proceedings, condemning 4.44 acres of the Schells' land for a highway relocation project.
- The condemnation divided the Schells' property into two separate parcels, a 27.58-acre tract and a 7.98-acre tract.
- As a result of the highway construction, the smaller 7.98-acre parcel became landlocked.
- After the construction, the Schells' easternmost poultry house was situated approximately 250 to 270 feet from the new highway's nearest traffic lane, raising the issue of potential negative effects on the poultry from proximity to the highway.
Procedural Posture:
- The Arkansas State Highway Commission brought an eminent domain action against Harold D. and Bertha E. Schell in an Arkansas trial court.
- A jury trial was held to determine the amount of just compensation for the condemned property.
- The jury returned a verdict awarding the Schells $50,000.00 in compensation, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict.
- The Arkansas State Highway Commission, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, with the Schells as appellees.
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Issue:
Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to allow an expert witness to testify about the specific investigation and hearsay sources that formed the basis of his opinion on severance damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Corbin, J.
Yes. A trial court errs when it prevents an expert witness from disclosing the factual basis of their opinion, as the jury must be able to evaluate the underpinnings of the opinion to properly assess its weight and credibility. Citing Ark. Unif. R. Evid. 703, the court reasoned that an expert may base an opinion on facts learned from others, including hearsay, as long as the data is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Preventing the witness, Neil Palmer, from detailing his consultations with poultry experts, industry professionals, and his review of a university study left his opinion 'unsupported in midair.' The court held that the relative weakness of the factual basis for an expert's opinion goes to its weight and credibility, not its admissibility, and therefore the jury was entitled to hear it.
Concurring - Mayfield, J.
Yes. While agreeing that the expert must be allowed to disclose the basis for his opinion, this does not mean the expert becomes the sole judge of the admissibility of the basis facts. The trial court retains its gatekeeping function and can exclude underlying data if its admission would be unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 or if the data is not of a type 'reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.' The concurring opinion emphasizes that inadmissible hearsay is admitted only to explain the basis of the expert's opinion, not for its substantive truth, and a limiting instruction to the jury is often appropriate. It suggests that in a new trial, a proffer of the evidence outside the jury's presence would be helpful to determine its purpose and admissibility.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the modern approach to expert testimony under the Rules of Evidence, prioritizing the jury's ability to weigh evidence over rigid exclusionary rules. It clarifies that Rule 703 is not merely a shield allowing experts to rely on hearsay, but also a sword allowing the proponent of the testimony to present that underlying data to bolster the expert's credibility. The ruling shifts the focus from the admissibility of the underlying data itself to the reasonableness of the expert's reliance on it. The concurrence serves as an important check, reminding courts of their gatekeeping role under Rule 403 to prevent expert testimony from becoming a conduit for prejudicial or unreliable hearsay.
