Arizona v. Washington
434 U.S. 497 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
When a defendant's improper and prejudicial remarks provoke a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial if the trial judge exercised "sound discretion" in determining that a "manifest necessity" existed, even if the judge did not make an explicit, on-the-record finding of such necessity.
Facts:
- George Washington (respondent) was accused of murdering a hotel night clerk.
- At Washington's first trial in 1971, the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense.
- A second trial began in January 1975.
- During jury selection for the second trial, the prosecutor mentioned that some witnesses had testified in a proceeding four years earlier.
- In his opening statement, Washington's defense counsel told the jury that the prosecutor in the first trial had hidden statements and purposely withheld evidence.
- Defense counsel explicitly stated that due to this prosecutorial misconduct, the Arizona Supreme Court had granted a new trial.
Procedural Posture:
- George Washington was convicted of murder in an Arizona state trial court in 1971.
- In 1973, the Superior Court of Pima County ordered a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct (withholding of exculpatory evidence).
- The Arizona Supreme Court, the state's highest court, affirmed the new trial order.
- During the second trial in 1975, the trial judge granted the prosecutor's motion for a mistrial over the defendant's objection.
- The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review the mistrial ruling.
- Washington filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The District Court granted the writ, finding the state trial judge had failed to make an on-the-record finding of 'manifest necessity'.
- The State of Arizona appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate federal appellate court.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar a retrial when a state trial judge declares a mistrial over the defendant's objection, based on improper and prejudicial remarks made by defense counsel during an opening statement, without explicitly finding 'manifest necessity' on the record?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stevens
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial because a trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial based on potential juror bias is entitled to great deference. The standard of 'manifest necessity' does not mean a literal or absolute necessity but rather a 'high degree' of necessity, the assessment of which is best made by the trial judge who is present to observe the events and their impact on the jury. In this case, the judge did not act precipitately; he heard extensive arguments from both sides and acted deliberately and responsibly out of concern for the fairness of the trial. The absence of an express finding of 'manifest necessity' or a detailed articulation of the judge's reasoning is not a fatal constitutional defect when the record itself provides sufficient justification for the mistrial ruling.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
The dissent does not directly answer the issue but argues the Court of Appeals erred in its reasoning. A silent record is not a sufficient basis to conclude a state court committed constitutional error by applying an incorrect legal standard. Federal courts should assume the state judge applied the correct standards unless there is evidence to the contrary. The proper course of action is not for the Supreme Court to review the record in the first instance, but to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the lower courts to make the initial judgment under the correct legal standard.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial because the record does not demonstrate that a 'manifest necessity' existed for the mistrial. The majority improperly infers that the trial judge made the required assessment of incurable prejudice when the record shows the judge was almost exclusively focused on the evidentiary admissibility of the defense counsel's remarks. The judge failed to explore less drastic alternatives, such as curative instructions, and made no finding that the prejudice was so great that it tainted the entire panel. Where the need for a mistrial is not plain and obvious, the record must make clear that the trial judge scrupulously considered available alternatives, which this record fails to do.
Analysis:
This decision significantly shapes the 'manifest necessity' doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause by establishing a highly deferential standard of appellate review for mistrials granted due to potential juror bias. By holding that an explicit, on-the-record finding of 'manifest necessity' is not constitutionally required, the Court gives trial judges greater flexibility and authority to manage their courtrooms and protect the integrity of trials. This ruling makes it more difficult for defendants to succeed on double jeopardy claims following mistrials for prejudicial comments, as reviewing courts will uphold the trial judge's decision as long as the record shows they exercised 'sound discretion' and did not act irrationally or irresponsibly.
