Arizona v. Mauro
107 S. Ct. 1931, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 1933, 95 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
Allowing a suspect who has invoked their right to counsel to speak with their spouse in the presence of a police officer does not constitute interrogation, or its functional equivalent, under the Fifth Amendment if the police do not create or orchestrate the situation to elicit incriminating statements.
Facts:
- William Mauro entered a Kmart store and told an employee he had killed his son.
- Police arrived, and Mauro admitted to the killing and led officers to the child's body.
- At the police station, after being given Miranda warnings twice, Mauro stated he would not make any more statements without a lawyer present, and all questioning ceased.
- Mauro's wife, who was being questioned separately, insisted on speaking with her husband.
- Police were reluctant but eventually agreed to the meeting, citing safety and security concerns.
- An officer informed both Mauro and his wife that they could speak only if an officer was present to observe.
- The officer sat in the room with a tape recorder placed in plain sight on a desk and recorded the conversation.
- During the conversation, Mauro told his wife not to answer any questions until she had a lawyer.
Procedural Posture:
- Mauro was tried in an Arizona state court for murder and child abuse.
- Before trial, Mauro's counsel filed a motion to suppress the tape-recorded conversation with his wife.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the police conduct was not a ruse or subterfuge to avoid Miranda.
- The recording was played for the jury to rebut Mauro's insanity defense, and the jury convicted him.
- Mauro appealed his conviction to the Arizona Supreme Court.
- The Arizona Supreme Court (the state's highest court) reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' actions constituted interrogation in violation of Mauro's rights.
- The State of Arizona petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does allowing a suspect, who has invoked his right to counsel, to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer constitute interrogation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. Allowing a suspect to speak with a spouse in the presence of a police officer does not constitute interrogation where police do not compel or coerce the suspect to speak. The Court reasoned that interrogation under Miranda and Rhode Island v. Innis includes either express questioning or its 'functional equivalent'—any words or actions by police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Here, the officers did not question Mauro. Furthermore, there was no psychological ploy; the meeting was initiated at Mrs. Mauro's insistent request, not as a police stratagem. The officer's presence was justified by legitimate security concerns, and the situation, viewed from the suspect's perspective, was not coercive. The mere possibility that a suspect might incriminate himself is insufficient to transform the situation into an interrogation, as volunteered statements are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The police conduct was the functional equivalent of interrogation. The dissent argued that the police employed a powerful psychological ploy by setting up a confrontation between Mauro and his wife at a time when he clearly desired to remain silent. The police knew or should have known that this encounter was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating response, which is the standard set by Rhode Island v. Innis. A police supervisor testified that one purpose of monitoring the conversation was to 'shed light on our case.' By controlling the circumstances and exploiting the custodial situation, the police did indirectly what they were forbidden from doing directly: they interrogated Mauro after he had invoked his right to counsel.
Analysis:
This decision refines the definition of 'interrogation' under Rhode Island v. Innis by clarifying the state of mind required of police. It establishes that an officer's mere awareness that a suspect might make an incriminating statement is not enough to constitute the 'functional equivalent' of interrogation. The ruling distinguishes between passive police conduct in response to a third party's request and active police strategies designed to elicit a confession. This gives law enforcement more latitude in managing custodial situations, but it also creates a fine line between permissible observation and impermissible psychological ploys that could be challenged in future cases.
