Yes, it can be a 'harmless mistake.' Using a forced confession is a mistake during the trial, but it's not the kind of mistake that breaks the entire justice system. It's like using one piece of bad evidence. A higher court can look at all the other evidence and decide if the jury would have found the person guilty anyway. If so, the conviction can stay.

But in this specific case, it was NOT a harmless mistake. A confession is the most powerful kind of evidence there is. The government's case was very weak without it. The jury probably wouldn't have believed the second confession without hearing the first one. Because the forced confession was so important to the case, we can't be sure it didn't affect the verdict, so Fulminante gets a new trial.

No, using a forced confession is never a harmless mistake. Our justice system says the government can't force people to confess. Using a forced confession is so wrong and has such a big impact on a jury that it always ruins the trial. The conviction should automatically be thrown out, no matter how much other evidence there is.

First of all, the confession wasn't even forced; the man never said he was scared. But even if it was, it was a harmless mistake here. The jury heard a second, perfectly legal confession that was even more detailed. That, plus the other evidence, was more than enough to convict him. The first confession didn't make a difference.

I agree that using a forced confession can be a harmless mistake, and I don't think this one was even forced. But, I also agree that a confession is incredibly powerful evidence. In this specific case, I can't say for sure that it didn't influence the jury. So, to make sure there's a clear decision, I'll join the group that says it wasn't a harmless mistake, and Fulminante gets a new trial.

Yes, Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was forced because Sarivola promised to protect Fulminante from harm if he confessed. Using a forced confession as evidence can be a harmless mistake if there is lots of other proof of guilt. But in this case, using the forced confession was a serious mistake that likely changed the outcome of the trial.

No, Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was not forced. Fulminante was not in police custody, Sarivola did not threaten him, and Fulminante could have walked away at any time. The facts don't show that Fulminante was pressured into confessing. Even if the confession was forced, using it in the trial would be a harmless mistake because there was so much other proof of guilt, including a second confession that was not forced.

The trial court was right to find Fulminante's confession voluntary and allow it as evidence. However, most of the other Supreme Court justices think the confession was forced. If that's the case, using a forced confession might be a harmless mistake, but it wasn't harmless in this trial. To give a clear answer, the Arizona Supreme Court's decision should be upheld.

Structural error is that which " `affect [s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'"

A classic trial error is one "which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a constitutional harmless error analysis.

A deprivation of a constitutional right is a "structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds."

Structural errors are "defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism which defy analysis by `harmless-error'standards, "

A defendant's "confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him."

—the Illinois Supreme Court amended the Wilson rule to reflect that only the use of a physically coerced confession as substantive evidence against a defendant could never be harmless error.

Explaining why certain constitutional violations amount to structural defects, the US Supreme Court noted that " `[w] ithout these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.'"

—the Supreme Court held that an offer to protect Fulminante from fellow inmates only if he confessed—which the court characterized as "a credible threat of physical violence"—rendered the confession involuntary, and in Payne

"[I] n order to determine the voluntariness of a confession, the Court must look to the `totality of the circumstances' and determine whether the defendant's will was overborne. "

Yes. The admission of an involuntary confession is a 'trial error' subject to harmless-error analysis. Such an error occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury and can be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not a 'structural defect' in the trial mechanism, like the denial of counsel or a biased judge, which affects the entire framework of the trial and defies harmless-error analysis. The admission of a coerced confession is functionally indistinguishable from other evidentiary errors, such as admitting evidence from an illegal search, which have long been subject to this standard.

Although harmless-error analysis applies, the admission of Fulminante's coerced confession in this specific case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be reversed. A defendant's own confession is profoundly impactful evidence, and its admission risked tainting the jury's entire perception of the case. The State's case relied heavily on the confessions, as acknowledged by the prosecutor, and the second confession to Donna Sarivola may not have been believed by the jury without the corroborating (but coerced) first confession. Therefore, the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the coerced confession did not contribute to the conviction.

No. The admission of a coerced confession is a constitutional error so basic to a fair trial that it can never be treated as harmless error and requires automatic reversal. Decades of precedent have treated coerced confessions as fundamentally different from other types of evidence, as their use violates due process regardless of other evidence. This is because their use offends the principles of an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system of justice; their impact on a jury is impossible to accurately assess; and their admission aborts the basic trial process, rendering it fundamentally unfair.

The confession to Sarivola was not coerced under the totality of the circumstances, as Fulminante offered no evidence he was actually in fear and stipulated that he never sought protection. Even if the confession were deemed coerced and its admission an error, the error was harmless. The second, untainted confession to Donna Sarivola, which provided even more detail, combined with the physical evidence, constituted overwhelming evidence of guilt, making the admission of the first confession harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

For the reasons stated by The Chief Justice, the confession was not coerced, and harmless-error analysis is the appropriate standard for coerced confessions. However, for the reasons stated by Justice White, the admission of the confession in this particular case was not harmless. A full confession has an indelible impact on a jury that is difficult to overstate. To provide a clear mandate in this capital case, I accept the majority's holding that the confession was coerced and concur in the judgment that its admission was not harmless error, thus affirming the reversal of the conviction.

Yes, Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was coerced because the confession was obtained in exchange for Sarivola's offer of protection from physical violence, which overbore Fulminante's will. The admission of a coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis because it is a trial error that can be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented. However, in this case, the admission of the confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

No, Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was not coerced. Fulminante was not in custody, Sarivola did not threaten him, and Fulminante was free to leave at any time. The facts do not show that Fulminante's will was overborne. Even if the confession was coerced, its admission would be harmless error because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including a second, untainted confession.

The trial court did not err in finding Fulminante's confession voluntary and admitting it. However, a majority of the Court finds the confession coerced. In that posture, harmless error analysis should apply, but the admission of the confession here was not harmless. To provide a clear mandate, the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court should be affirmed.

Arizona v. Fulminante

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Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

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