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Aransas Project v. Bryan Shaw

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
775 F.3d 641 (2014)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Under the Endangered Species Act, liability for an indirect 'take' requires proof that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the harm, which involves a direct and reasonably foreseeable link, not merely a 'but-for' causal connection that is attenuated by multiple, independent, and intervening factors.


Facts:

  • The Aransas-Wood Buffalo (AWB) flock of whooping cranes, an endangered species, winters at the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge in Texas.
  • The refuge is adjacent to the San Antonio Bay estuary, which is a critical habitat for the cranes and receives freshwater primarily from the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers.
  • The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), a state agency, is responsible for regulating and issuing permits for the withdrawal of surface water from these rivers.
  • During a severe drought in the winter of 2008-2009, freshwater inflow into the bay was significantly reduced.
  • This reduction, combined with the drought, increased the bay's salinity, leading to a decrease in the availability of blue crabs and wolfberries, the cranes' primary food sources.
  • During that same winter, four crane carcasses were recovered, and biologists estimated that a total of 23 cranes died.
  • Necropsies performed on two of the recovered carcasses listed emaciation as a contributing cause of death.
  • The Aransas Project (TAP), an environmental non-profit, was formed in response to these crane deaths to protect their habitat.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Aransas Project (TAP) sued officials of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
  • TAP alleged that TCEQ's water permitting practices violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
  • The Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority (GBRA), Texas Chemical Council, and San Antonio River Authority (SARA) were granted leave to intervene as defendants.
  • After an eight-day bench trial, the district court found that the state defendants had violated the ESA.
  • The district court issued an injunction ordering TCEQ to cease granting new water permits and to seek an Incidental Take Permit.
  • The district court denied the defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal but slightly amended the injunction.
  • The state defendants (appellants) and intervenor defendants (appellants) appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which granted a stay of the injunction pending the appeal.

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Issue:

Does a state agency's issuance of water use permits, which contribute to reduced freshwater flows in a river system, proximately cause a 'take' of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act when the species' death is also influenced by a severe drought and other natural, intervening factors?


Opinions:

Majority - Per Curiam

No. A state agency's issuance of water permits does not proximately cause a 'take' under the ESA where the causal chain is attenuated by numerous, independent, and unforeseeable factors. The court reasoned that liability under the ESA requires proximate causation, as established in Babbitt v. Sweet Home, which serves to eliminate liability for remote or fortuitous consequences. The chain of causation here—from TCEQ issuing permits, to hundreds of third parties withdrawing water, to reduced river flows, to increased bay salinity, to a decline in the cranes' food sources, and finally to the cranes' deaths—was too long and tenuous. This chain was interrupted by multiple independent and uncontrollable contingencies, most notably a severe and unforeseeable drought, but also other natural forces like tides and temperature, as well as the choices of individual water users. The court concluded that the crane deaths were not a foreseeable result of TCEQ's permitting actions but rather a 'fortuity' resulting from a confluence of adverse factors, thus failing the legal test for proximate cause.



Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies the application of the proximate cause standard for indirect 'take' liability under the Endangered Species Act, particularly concerning government regulatory actions. By rejecting a simple 'but-for' causation test in a complex ecosystem, the court makes it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to hold agencies liable for harms that are several steps removed from their actions. The ruling emphasizes that intervening natural events, like a severe drought, can break the chain of legal causation, thereby insulating a regulatory body from liability. This precedent will likely force future plaintiffs in similar cases to demonstrate a much more direct and foreseeable link between a challenged government action and the specific harm to a protected species, beyond showing a general contribution to environmental degradation.

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