Antonio Passaro, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
935 F.3d 243 (2019)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from private ADA Title I claims by removing a case to federal court or by making general statements of commitment to equal employment opportunity laws; furthermore, claim preclusion does not bar a subsequent federal civil rights action for remedies, such as compensatory damages, that were unavailable in a prior state administrative grievance process and its state-court review, even if the actions arise from the same underlying conduct.

Facts:

Antonio Passaro Jr. worked as a Special Agent with the Virginia Department of State Police.
In 2008, Passaro transferred to the department's High Tech Crimes Unit, where he investigated child pornography cases.
Starting in 2010, Passaro began receiving disciplinary notices for alleged infractions related to his failure to follow proper procedures and manage his caseload.
In April and May 2012, Passaro conducted an investigation that the department claimed he mismanaged.
In July 2012, a doctor diagnosed Passaro with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from his frequent exposure to child pornography images at work.
Passaro sought a transfer from the High Tech Crimes Unit, which he claims was not granted.
On February 6, 2013, Passaro learned he was being recommended for demotion from Special Agent to Trooper.
In March 2013, Passaro was fired.

Procedural Posture:

On February 8, 2013, Antonio Passaro Jr. filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging failure to make reasonable accommodations for his PTSD and harassment/discrimination based on disability and national origin.
After his termination, Passaro filed a grievance with Virginia's Office of Employment Dispute Resolution under Virginia Code § 2.2-3003, claiming unjustified discipline/termination and discrimination/harassment.
A hearing officer held a hearing and issued a decision that largely focused on department policies, upholding Passaro's termination despite overturning some disciplinary action.
Passaro's administrative appeals of the hearing officer's ruling were denied.
Passaro appealed the grievance decision to a Virginia state court for review under Virginia Code § 2.2-3006(B), which largely rejected his arguments but concluded the hearing officer had overlooked certain testimony and remanded the case.
On remand, the hearing officer affirmed his earlier decision, and Passaro's subsequent administrative appeals were again denied.
Passaro returned to state court, which affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
Passaro appealed to Virginia's intermediate appellate court, which affirmed (67 Va.App. 357, 796 S.E.2d 439 (2017)).
In May 2018, the Virginia Supreme Court declined Passaro's request for rehearing, concluding the state-court appeals process.
In November 2016, while those state appeals were ongoing, Passaro brought the instant action in Virginia state court against the Commonwealth, asserting unlawful discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and improper denials of reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The Commonwealth timely removed the case to federal district court, asserting federal question jurisdiction based on the Title VII claims.
The Commonwealth moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion in part, dismissing Passaro's ADA claim as barred by state sovereign immunity and his Title VII national-origin discrimination claim (with leave to replead).
Passaro filed an amended complaint, and the Commonwealth answered, asserting various defenses including res judicata.
The parties then consented to have the matter proceed before a magistrate judge for all purposes.
Before the magistrate judge, the Commonwealth sought and was granted a stay of the federal action pending final resolution of Passaro's state-court appeals.
After the stay was lifted in May 2018, the Commonwealth moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state-court proceedings had claim-preclusive effect on Passaro's discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII.
The district court agreed with the Commonwealth and entered judgment for the Commonwealth.

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Issue:

1. Does a state waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from private ADA Title I claims when it removes a case to federal court or makes general statements about adhering to federal EEO laws? 2. Does Virginia's claim preclusion doctrine, specifically Rule 1:6, bar a plaintiff from pursuing Title VII claims for compensatory damages in federal court when such damages were unavailable in a prior state administrative grievance process and its associated state-court review, even if both actions arise from the same underlying conduct?

Opinions:

Majority - Richardson, Circuit Judge

1. No, a state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from private ADA Title I claims by removing a case to federal court or through general statements of commitment to EEO laws, because an unequivocal waiver requires a clear and express declaration. Congress exceeded its authority in purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Title I of the ADA, as held in Board of Trustees v. Garrett. Therefore, a private plaintiff must show that the state has waived its immunity. The court, citing Stewart v. North Carolina, affirmed its precedent that a state does not lose sovereign immunity by removing a case to federal court if it retained immunity in state court. Both federal and Virginia law require a "clear declaration" or "explicit and express waiver" of sovereign immunity. The Commonwealth's employee handbook statements about equal employment opportunity and EEOC posters merely acknowledge the state's existing obligations under federal law and mechanisms for federal enforcement actions, not a waiver of immunity from private lawsuits. Virginia Code § 2.2-3903(D) also does not constitute such a waiver. 2. No, Virginia's claim preclusion doctrine, specifically Rule 1:6, does not bar a plaintiff from pursuing Title VII claims for compensatory damages in federal court when such damages were unavailable in a prior state administrative grievance process and its associated state-court review. State law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a prior state-court judgment on a Title VII action. While Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:6 adopts a transactional approach to claim preclusion, stating that claims arising from the same "conduct, transaction or occurrence" are precluded, the rule is subject to longstanding principles and "ordinary caveats." A key caveat is that claim preclusion does not apply if procedural rules prevented the plaintiff from asserting all claims for relief in a single case, particularly when the initial forum could not award the "full measure of relief sought." Virginia's administrative grievance procedures, including their state-court review, do not permit compensatory damages, offering only limited monetary remedies such as back pay. Title VII, however, specifically provides for compensatory damages for intentional discrimination, including for harms like emotional distress. Since Passaro could not seek compensatory damages in the prior grievance or state-court review, claim preclusion does not bar him from seeking them in this federal action. The court clarified that the language in Rule 1:6, "regardless of... the particular remedies sought," refers to remedies a litigant voluntarily chooses not to pursue, not remedies that are procedurally unavailable. To rule otherwise would force a litigant to choose between administrative review (without damages or a jury trial) and a civil action, which would unfairly deprive them of substantive rights. The court declined to certify the question to the Virginia Supreme Court, noting the Commonwealth's choice to remove the case to federal court and the sufficiency of existing state law guidance.

Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Traxler, Senior Circuit Judge

I concur with the majority opinion regarding the dismissal of Passaro's ADA claim on sovereign immunity grounds (Sections I and II). However, I dissent from the majority's resolution of the claim preclusion issue for the Title VII claims (Section III). I believe this issue should be certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The legal reasoning put forth by the majority, while potentially correct, is novel and addresses a precise issue for which there is no direct Virginia case law. Given the significant impact this case will have on a heavily litigated area of law, the Virginia Supreme Court, as the highest court in the state, should be the one to interpret its own Rule 1:6 and establish new legal ground on this matter.

Analysis:

This case significantly clarifies the limits of state sovereign immunity and the scope of claim preclusion in the context of federal civil rights claims. It reinforces the high bar for states to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, ensuring that states are not inadvertently subjected to private lawsuits under Title I of the ADA through general policy statements or removal to federal court. More critically, the ruling provides a crucial safeguard for plaintiffs by preventing state procedural rules from precluding federal civil rights claims for damages that were genuinely unavailable in a prior state administrative or judicial proceeding. This ensures that litigants are not forced to forfeit substantive remedies like compensatory damages when pursuing an administrative grievance, potentially leading to more parallel state and federal litigation where state forums cannot offer a full range of relief.

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