Anna Harris v. Edna Itzhaki Rafael Itzhaki
183 F.3d 1043, 99 Daily Journal DAR 7009, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5513 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A tenant who suffers a distinct and palpable injury from a landlord's discriminatory housing practices against third parties has standing to sue for damages under the Fair Housing Act, even after vacating the premises. Evidence of such practices, including discriminatory statements and disparate treatment of testers, is sufficient to survive summary judgment if it creates a genuine factual question as to whether the landlord's proffered non-discriminatory reasons are pretextual.
Facts:
- Anna Harris, an African-American woman, was the only Black tenant in an apartment complex owned by Rafael and Edna Itzhaki.
- Leah Waldman, another tenant, assisted the Itzhakis by showing vacant apartments, collecting rent, and holding spare keys.
- On December 6, 1995, Harris overheard Waldman state to a repairman, 'The owners don’t want to rent to Blacks.'
- Harris complained to the Westside Fair Housing Council, which dispatched a white tester (Faith Bautista) and a black tester (Karla Ford) to inquire about a vacancy.
- Mr. Itzhaki and Ms. Waldman provided the white tester with favorable terms, encouragement, and prompt assistance.
- In contrast, Mr. Itzhaki quoted potentially higher rent to the black tester, questioned her desire to live in the area, emphasized drawbacks of the unit, and Ms. Waldman provided less assistance.
- After Harris complained, she received two 'pay rent or quit' notices in subsequent months, which deviated from the Itzhakis' informal policy of calling tenants before issuing such notices.
- During the litigation, Harris moved out of the Shenandoah Apartments.
Procedural Posture:
- Anna Harris filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the Itzhakis, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and other civil rights statutes.
- The Itzhakis filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court granted the Itzhakis' motion, dismissing Harris's action on two grounds: lack of standing and, alternatively, insufficient evidence of discrimination.
- Anna Harris (appellant) appealed the district court's final judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a tenant who alleges injury from a landlord's discriminatory practices against prospective minority renters have standing to sue for damages under the Fair Housing Act, even after moving out, and is the evidence of these practices sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Hug, Chief Judge
Yes. A tenant who alleges injury from a landlord's discriminatory practices has standing to sue for damages under the Fair Housing Act, and the evidence presented is sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) has a very liberal standing requirement, which only demands the 'Article III minima of injury in fact.' A plaintiff need not be the direct target of discrimination to sue; they only need to allege a 'distinct and palpable injury,' such as the loss of interracial associations, which Harris did. Although Harris's move from the apartment renders her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot, her claim for money damages remains a live controversy. Furthermore, applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Harris established a prima facie case of disparate treatment through evidence of retaliatory eviction notices, disparate treatment of housing testers, and a discriminatory statement by the owners' apparent agent. The Itzhakis offered non-discriminatory explanations, but Harris raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether these explanations were pretextual. Because the crux of a discrimination claim is the 'elusive factual question of intentional discrimination,' and issues of credibility and intent are for the jury, summary judgment was inappropriate.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the broad standing afforded to plaintiffs under the Fair Housing Act, clarifying that even indirect victims of discrimination who are deprived of the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated community have suffered a cognizable injury. It strongly reinforces the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in FHA cases at the summary judgment stage. The court's holistic approach to the evidence—viewing the discriminatory statement, tester results, and deviation from policy together—sets a precedent against defendants defeating summary judgment by discrediting each piece of evidence in isolation. This makes it more difficult for defendants to get FHA cases dismissed before trial, ensuring that juries, rather than judges, resolve key factual questions of intent and pretext.
