Andrus v. Texas
140 S. Ct. 1875, 207 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2020)
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Rule of Law:
A capital defense counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into a defendant's background and present readily available, voluminous mitigating evidence constitutes deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington; state appellate courts must properly engage with the prejudice prong of Strickland by reweighing all available mitigation and aggravation evidence.
Facts:
- Terence Andrus's mother began selling drugs and engaging in prostitution from their apartment when he was six years old, often leaving him and his four siblings to fend for themselves while she was high.
- By age 12, Andrus assumed the role of caretaker for his younger siblings, cleaning, cooking, helping with homework, and getting them ready for school.
- At age 16, Andrus was sent to a juvenile detention facility (Texas Youth Commission) for allegedly serving as a lookout during a robbery, where he was exposed to gang culture, administered high doses of psychotropic drugs, and subjected to extended solitary confinement, which led to suicidal urges.
- At age 20, while under the influence of PCP-laced marijuana, Andrus unsuccessfully attempted a carjacking, during which he fired multiple shots, killing car owner Avelino Diaz and bystander Kim-Phuong Vu Bui.
- During Andrus's capital murder trial, his defense counsel neglected to conduct a thorough investigation into his background, opting instead to present a minimal mitigation case based on ill-prepared witnesses, while conceding guilt and focusing solely on the punishment phase.
- Andrus's counsel failed to investigate or rebut the State's aggravating evidence, including past aggressive behavior in juvenile detention and an alleged prior aggravated robbery.
- Years later, during an 8-day evidentiary hearing in state habeas proceedings, a "tidal wave" of readily available mitigating evidence came to light, detailing Andrus's severely abusive and neglectful childhood, mental health struggles (including a diagnosis of affective psychosis at age 10 or 11), and traumatic experiences in juvenile custody, none of which had been presented at trial.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Terence Andrus with capital murder in a Texas trial court.
- A jury in the Texas trial court found Andrus guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
- Andrus filed an unsuccessful direct appeal of his conviction and sentence.
- Andrus filed a state habeas application in a Texas trial court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence.
- The Texas trial court conducted an 8-day evidentiary hearing and recommended that Andrus be granted habeas relief and a new sentencing proceeding, finding counsel constitutionally deficient and prejudicial.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) rejected the trial court's recommendation in an unpublished per curiam order, concluding without explanation that Andrus failed to satisfy his burden under Strickland v. Washington.
- Andrus petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a capital defense counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into a defendant's background and present readily available, voluminous mitigating evidence constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, and must a state appellate court adequately analyze both prongs of Strickland when evaluating such a claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, a capital defense counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into a defendant's background and present readily available, voluminous mitigating evidence constitutes deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, and a state appellate court must adequately analyze both prongs of Strickland when evaluating such a claim. The Court found that Andrus's counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient under the first prong of Strickland because counsel performed virtually no mitigation investigation, overlooking vast amounts of readily available mitigating evidence regarding Andrus's traumatic childhood, mental health issues, and experiences in juvenile detention. Counsel also failed to adequately investigate the few witnesses he did call, leading to unhelpful or damaging testimony, and failed to investigate or rebut the State's aggravating evidence. These failures stemmed from inattention, not a reasoned strategic judgment, especially given counsel's stated strategy to concede guilt and focus on mitigation. The Court then vacated the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) and remanded because it was unclear whether the CCA had properly engaged with the second prong of Strickland – prejudice – by reweighing all available mitigation evidence (both presented at trial and discovered later in habeas) against the aggravating evidence. The CCA's one-sentence denial did not conclusively reveal its reasoning regarding prejudice, and its concurring opinion on prejudice did not garner a majority.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
No, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not fail to adequately analyze both prongs of Strickland because its opinion explicitly stated that Andrus failed to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington to show prejudice. Justice Alito argued that the Supreme Court's claim that it was "unclear" if the CCA considered prejudice was "hard to take seriously," as the CCA's opinion explicitly stated Andrus failed to show "a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different, but for counsel’s deficient performance." He further pointed out that the CCA noted the trial court's misstatement of the Strickland prejudice standard. Alito criticized the Court for selectively doubting the CCA's decision and for engaging in "first view" analysis on the performance prong while remanding on prejudice. He emphasized the strong aggravating evidence of Andrus's brutal and senseless violence (two murders, prior armed robberies, and extensive violent conduct in detention) which, when weighed against the mitigation, likely would have prevented a finding of prejudice anyway, suggesting that there was strong support in the record for the CCA's holding that prejudice was not established.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the stringent requirements for effective assistance of counsel in capital cases, particularly the duty to conduct a thorough investigation into mitigating evidence, as established by Strickland v. Washington. It highlights the Supreme Court's willingness to review and correct state court applications of Strickland, especially when the lower court's reasoning on the prejudice prong is ambiguous or inadequate. The remand underscores that a perfunctory denial without proper reweighing of all mitigation and aggravation evidence is insufficient, signaling that state appellate courts must explicitly demonstrate their analysis of both Strickland prongs. This decision emphasizes the critical role of mitigation evidence in capital sentencing and reinforces the high standard for defense counsel in such proceedings.
