Andrews v. Andrews
116 Wash. 513 (1921)
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Rule of Law:
Property acquired through an oral contract to make a will in exchange for services provided by a marital community is community property, not separate property acquired by 'gift, bequest, devise, or descent.' Consequently, a spouse is an interested party under the dead man's statute and is barred from testifying about the formation of such a contract.
Facts:
- In 1903, A. D. Andrews and his wife cared for his mother, Harriet Andrews, who had cancer.
- Subsequently, his parents, Joshua and Harriet Andrews, moved into the home of A. D. Andrews and his wife.
- In January 1904, shortly before Harriet's death, she willed her property to her husband Joshua, expressing a desire that it later go to their son, A. D. Andrews.
- A. D. Andrews alleged that at this time, he and his father, Joshua, made an oral agreement: A. D. Andrews and his family would care for Joshua for as long as he desired, in exchange for Joshua agreeing to will all his property to A. D. Andrews upon his death.
- After his wife's death, Joshua continued to live with and be cared for by his son's family until the family moved to Nome, Alaska, in 1906 for business reasons.
- Joshua declined an invitation to move to Alaska with the family, citing his age and the climate.
- In 1908, Joshua remarried the respondent and lived with her until his death years later.
Procedural Posture:
- A. D. Andrews filed suit in a trial court to enforce an alleged oral contract against his deceased father's estate.
- After a trial on the merits, the lower court dismissed the action.
- A. D. Andrews, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Is property that would be acquired through the performance of an oral contract to make a will, where the consideration consists of care and support provided by a marital community, considered community property, thereby making the plaintiff's spouse an interested party barred from testifying under the dead man's statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Bridges, J.
Yes, property acquired through a contract to make a will in exchange for community services is community property, and the spouse is therefore an interested party whose testimony is barred. The admissibility of the wife's testimony hinges on whether the property sought would be separate or community property. Washington's dead man's statute, Rem. Code § 1211, prohibits a 'party in interest' from testifying about a transaction with a deceased person. Property is separate if acquired by 'gift, bequest, devise or descent.' Here, the property would have been acquired by contract for valuable consideration—the care, housing, and support provided by the joint efforts and resources of both A. D. Andrews and his wife. Since the consideration came from the community, the property would be community property. Therefore, the wife is a party in interest, and her testimony about the oral contract is inadmissible. Without her testimony, there is insufficient evidence to establish the contract.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between property acquired by contract versus property acquired by bequest under Washington's community property laws, particularly in the context of estate litigation. It establishes that the character of property promised in a will is determined by the nature of the consideration given for it. By classifying property earned through community efforts as community property, the ruling significantly curtails the ability to enforce oral contracts to make a will, as the spouse, often a key witness, is disqualified from testifying under the dead man's statute. This makes such claims substantially more difficult to prove, reinforcing the court's stated suspicion of parol evidence in these matters.
