Andrew v. White
604 U.S. 86 (2025)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief when evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair, and this principle constitutes "clearly established Federal law" for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
Facts:
- On November 20, 2001, Rob Andrew was fatally shot in his garage.
- Brenda Andrew, who herself had been shot in the arm during the incident, told police that two armed assailants committed the shooting.
- Brenda Andrew had separated from her husband, Rob Andrew, and was dating James Pavatt.
- After Rob Andrew's death, Pavatt and Andrew traveled to Mexico together, and Pavatt eventually confessed to committing the shooting with a friend, denying Andrew's involvement.
- At Brenda Andrew's capital murder trial, the prosecution introduced extensive testimony about her sexual partners, outfits, underwear, and parenting, often contrasting her with Rob Andrew.
- The State later conceded that much of the evidence presented about Andrew's character and sexual behavior was irrelevant to the issues in the case.
Procedural Posture:
- An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of capital murder and sentenced her to death.
- Andrew appealed her conviction and sentence to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), arguing that the introduction of irrelevant evidence violated state law and the Federal Due Process Clause.
- The OCCA affirmed her conviction and sentence, holding that while some evidence was irrelevant, its admission was harmless error.
- Andrew filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court, reiterating her due process claim, which the District Court denied.
- Andrew appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Andrew as appellant, White as appellee), which affirmed the District Court's denial, holding that Andrew had failed to cite "clearly established federal law" governing her claim under AEDPA.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the statement in Payne v. Tennessee that the Due Process Clause provides relief when unduly prejudicial evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair constitute "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA for federal habeas review?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, the statement in Payne v. Tennessee that the Due Process Clause provides relief when unduly prejudicial evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair does constitute "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA for federal habeas review. When this Court relies on a legal rule or principle to decide a case, that principle is a "holding" for AEDPA purposes. In Payne, the Court eliminated a categorical Eighth Amendment bar on victim-impact evidence in part because the Due Process Clause provided an available mechanism for relief against evidence that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders a trial fundamentally unfair. This reliance made the due process principle indispensable to Payne's decision and thus a holding. This principle was not new to Payne, as the Court had previously held that prejudicial or misleading statements could violate due process if they rendered a trial fundamentally unfair (citing Donnelly, Caldwell, Darden) and has continued to rely on it (Romano, Kansas v. Carr). The Tenth Circuit erred by limiting Payne to its specific facts (victim impact statements) or by deeming its statement a "pronouncement" rather than a holding. General legal principles, if holdings of this Court, can constitute clearly established law for AEDPA purposes and apply to new factual permutations. The Court of Appeals therefore erred by refusing to consider whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably applied these established due process principles. The case is remanded for the Tenth Circuit to conduct that inquiry, determining whether a fairminded jurist could disagree that the admission of irrelevant evidence was so "unduly prejudicial" as to render Andrew's trial "fundamentally unfair" in the guilt and sentencing phases, considering factors such as relevance, prejudice, and mitigating instructions.
Concurring - Alito, J.
Yes, a defendant's due process rights can be violated when properly admitted evidence is overwhelmed by a flood of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence that renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, acknowledging that existing case law, including Payne v. Tennessee and Romano v. Oklahoma, establishes this legal principle. However, he expressed no view on whether the very high standard required to demonstrate such a violation was met in Brenda Andrew's specific case.
Dissenting - Thomas, J.
No, the statement in Payne v. Tennessee is not "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA in this context, and the Tenth Circuit correctly identified this. The majority's decision errs by framing precedents at too high a level of generality, disregarding AEDPA's specificity requirement. Payne's statement regarding due process relief for unduly prejudicial evidence was dicta, not a holding, because it was not necessary to the disposition of that case, which found the victim-impact evidence legitimate. Even if considered a holding, its scope should be limited to victim-impact evidence, as Payne did not consider other types of evidence. Furthermore, Estelle v. McGuire, decided months after Payne, expressly reserved the very question the majority asserts Payne resolved, indicating it was not clearly established. The majority's approach redefines "clearly established" law to include debatable interpretations of precedent, which violates AEDPA's demanding standard that relief be granted only when an error is "beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." Fairminded jurists could reasonably disagree with the majority's broad interpretation of Payne as a generally applicable holding. AEDPA requires deference not just at the application stage, but also at the threshold step of identifying clearly established law, meaning a contestable interpretation cannot be deemed clearly established.
Analysis:
This Per Curiam opinion significantly clarifies the scope of "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA, underscoring that general legal principles from Supreme Court holdings, even if not applied to identical facts, can meet the AEDPA standard. It instructs lower courts not to narrowly interpret Supreme Court precedent to avoid federal habeas review, ensuring that a prior ruling's underlying reasoning, when essential to its outcome, holds precedential weight. This decision has important implications for future habeas petitions, as federal courts are now required to more robustly assess whether state court decisions unreasonably applied fundamental constitutional principles, not just exact factual matches. It reinforces the protective role of the Due Process Clause against fundamentally unfair trials caused by unduly prejudicial evidence.
