Andrea Sardis v. Overhead Door Corporation

Majority - Age, Circuit Judge

Yes, the district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony, and this harmful error requires reversal of the jury's verdict and entry of judgment as a matter of law for Overhead Door Corporation (ODC). The district court improperly abdicated its critical gatekeeping role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires explicit findings on an expert's relevance and reliability before admitting testimony. Instead, the court summarily dismissed ODC's Daubert challenges, stating they went only to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, which constituted an abuse of discretion. Dr. Sher Paul Singh, offered as the Estate's expert for the design defect claim, provided testimony that was both irrelevant and unreliable. His opinion that the container should have complied with ASTM D6039 was irrelevant because he admitted the container, with its triple-wall corrugated sides, was not a 'wood crate' as defined by the standard, and the standard did not address handholds. His claim that ODC breached industry standards by failing to test was also irrelevant because he could not identify the applicable testing standards, effectively pointing the court to 'Google' for verification. Furthermore, Dr. Singh's proximate causation opinion was unreliable because he conducted no testing on the container or a model, provided no objective analysis to support his conclusion that end cleats would have prevented the break, and could not quantify pull-strength resistance, making his opinion mere 'ipse dixit' (unsupported assertion). Dr. Michael S. Wogalter, the Estate's sole expert for the failure-to-warn claim, also offered irrelevant and unreliable opinions. His testimony that ODC 'should have known' about dangers by conducting a hazard analysis was irrelevant under Virginia law. Virginia jurisprudence (Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Watson) distinguishes between 'reason to know' (inferring a fact from available information, implying no duty to ascertain) and 'should know' (implying a duty to ascertain facts). Dr. Wogalter's testimony focused on what ODC 'should have' done to discover dangers, which is incompatible with Virginia's 'reason to know' standard. His hazard analysis testimony was unreliable because he offered no specific protocol for the container, conducted no testing, cited no existing literature on how to test human factors generally, and based his conclusions on speculation rather than objective data. His proximate causation opinion regarding unspecified warnings was similarly unreliable, lacking any factual basis or literature to demonstrate that Mr. Sardis would have heeded a warning. The district court's error in admitting this expert testimony was harmful because Drs. Singh and Wogalter were the only experts providing evidence necessary to establish the Estate’s claims. Without their inadmissible testimony, the Estate could not meet its burden of proof. The design defect claim failed under the consumer expectations test because, while a consumer might expect a handhold to 'hold up,' the Estate provided no admissible evidence to quantify this expected pull-strength resistance or to show Mr. Sardis's force fell within it. The failure-to-warn claim failed as there was no admissible evidence that ODC knew or had 'reason to know' of the specific dangers, or that any alleged breach proximately caused Mr. Sardis's injuries. Finally, the general negligence and breach of implied warranty claims, which share the 'unreasonably dangerous' product element with design defect and failure to warn, also failed for the same evidentiary deficiencies. Following Weisgram v. Marley Co., the Court found it fair to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law for ODC, as the Estate had ample notice of the expert challenges and failed to present alternative evidence.