Andrea Gogel v. KIA Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc.
904 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2018), vacated, 926 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2019) (granting rehearing en banc); This en banc decision itself is not given a reporter cite, but is filed as Case: 16-16850 Date Filed: 07/29/2020 Page: 1 of 150 (2020)
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Rule of Law:
An employee's conduct in opposing alleged unlawful employment practices is not protected under Title VII's opposition clause if the manner of opposition so interferes with the performance of her job duties that it renders her ineffective in the position for which she was employed, particularly for human resources professionals whose primary role is internal dispute resolution.
Facts:
- Kia Motors Manufacturing of Georgia (Kia) hired Andrea Gogel in 2008 as its Team Relations Department Manager, overseeing investigations into employee allegations of harassment and discrimination and reporting recommendations to Senior VP Randy Jackson.
- Diana Ledbetter, a General Affairs specialist, expressed discomfort with assigned duties (e.g., pouring wine for Korean executives) and believed her supervisor was in an inappropriate relationship with President Ahn, which Gogel sought to investigate but Jackson declined.
- In March 2009, Gogel objected to not being designated Head of Department (HOD) over Team Relations, while Robert Tyler was made HOD over both Team Relations and HR, believing it was due to gender discrimination.
- On November 10, 2010, Gogel filed her first EEOC charge alleging gender and national origin discrimination for not receiving the HOD designation, which Kia received on November 22.
- On December 10, 2010, Ledbetter filed her own EEOC charge, which Kia received notice of on December 23, noting it was from the same law firm as Gogel and Tyler.
- In early January 2011, Gogel's subordinates, Arthur Williams and Paul Grimes, separately informed Jackson and general counsel Webb that Gogel and Tyler were frequently meeting with Ledbetter, and Ledbetter stated Gogel was the 'ringleader' in planning lawsuits with the same attorney.
- On January 7, 2011, Jackson and Webb questioned Gogel about her interactions with Ledbetter, which Gogel denied were significant or related to lawsuits.
- Gogel was placed on administrative leave following the January 7 meeting and ultimately terminated on January 19, 2011.
Procedural Posture:
- Andrea Gogel sued Kia Motors Manufacturing of Georgia (Kia) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting claims for gender and national-origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kia on all claims.
- Gogel appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
- An Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed summary judgment on Gogel's discrimination claims but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Gogel’s claim that Kia fired her in retaliation for her exercise of protected conduct (Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 904 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2018)).
- The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacating the panel opinion (Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 926 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2019)).
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Issue:
Does an employer violate Title VII's anti-retaliation provision when it terminates a Team Relations Manager who, in the employer's good-faith belief, solicited a subordinate employee to file an EEOC charge and provided legal counsel information, thereby rendering her ineffective in a role primarily responsible for internal dispute resolution?
Opinions:
Majority - Branch, Circuit Judge
No, an employer does not violate Title VII's anti-retaliation provision when it terminates a Team Relations Manager who, in the employer's good-faith belief, solicited a subordinate employee to file an EEOC charge and provided legal counsel information, because such conduct renders her ineffective in a role primarily responsible for internal dispute resolution, making the conduct unprotected. The court stated that Title VII's opposition clause protection is not absolute; the manner of opposition must be 'reasonable.' Conduct becomes unreasonable if it 'so interferes with the performance' of job duties that it 'renders [the employee] ineffective in the position for which [she] was employed,' or if it 'unreasonably disrupts other employees or the workplace.' Citing Rosser, Hamm, Whatley, and Jones, the court reasoned that Gogel's alleged conduct of recruiting Ledbetter to sue Kia and providing legal counsel information directly conflicted with her core duties as Team Relations Manager. Her role was to resolve complaints internally, maintain morale, and prevent lawsuits, not instigate them. The court found Kia's good-faith belief that Gogel engaged in this conduct, based on the shared law firm, reports from subordinates Williams and Grimes, and Gogel's denials of significant interactions with Ledbetter (later contradicted by Gogel's admission of providing the attorney's name), was sufficient. The court emphasized that Title VII does not require employers to be mistaken or perfectly just, only non-discriminatory. Gogel failed to show pretext for Kia's stated reason for termination, as Kia did not terminate her after her own EEOC filing, but only after learning of the alleged solicitation. The court rejected the dissent's interpretation of Rollins as applying a broader balancing test to this scenario.
Concurring - William Pryor, Chief Judge
Yes, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the employer, as the legal analysis, despite judicial division, demonstrates no genuine dispute of material fact. Chief Judge Pryor concurred fully with the majority, adding a response to the dissent's suggestion that judicial division indicates a jury question. He stated that a count of judges (9 to 5, including the district judge who initially granted summary judgment) supports the absence of a jury question and, more importantly, the legal analysis faithfully applies precedent, leaving no doubt about the correctness of summary judgment.
Concurring in the judgment - Jordan, Circuit Judge
Yes, the judgment affirming summary judgment for Kia is correct, because Gogel did not create a jury issue as to pretext, even assuming she did not actually encourage or solicit lawsuits. Judge Jordan assumed, given the summary judgment stage, that Gogel did not encourage or solicit other employees to sue Kia. He believed Gogel established a prima facie case. However, Kia presented a non-discriminatory reason (it believed Gogel solicited lawsuits), and Gogel did not create a jury issue as to pretext under Reeves. Kia's belief was reasonable given evidence like the same law firm representing Gogel, Tyler, and Ledbetter, and Williams's statements about Ledbetter's confessions regarding Gogel's 'ringleader' role. Gogel's denials were not enough to overcome Kia's reasonable belief. He concluded that temporal proximity alone is insufficient when ample legitimate reasons support termination.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Wilson, Circuit Judge
No, summary judgment on Gogel’s retaliation claim should have been denied because there is enough circumstantial evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude Gogel was fired in retaliation for filing her own EEOC charge, which is protected activity under Title VII’s participation clause. Judge Wilson concurred that the opposition clause does not protect an employee's conduct if it renders her ineffective in her job. However, Gogel also brought a claim under the participation clause for filing her own EEOC charge. The close temporal proximity (two months) between Kia receiving notice of Gogel's EEOC charge and her termination is strong evidence of causation. This is bolstered by 'me too' evidence that Kia retaliated against Robert Tyler (fired after filing EEOC charge) and pressured Diana Ledbetter to drop her EEOC charge. Gogel's and Ledbetter's denials that Gogel encouraged lawsuits, combined with the other evidence, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kia's reason for termination was pretextual for retaliating against Gogel for her own EEOC filing.
Dissenting - Martin, Circuit Judge
No, the grant of summary judgment to Kia on Gogel's retaliation claim should be reversed, because Andrea Gogel presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding Kia’s true motivations for firing her. Judge Martin argued the majority misapplies the McDonnell Douglas framework by relying on post-trial appellate review standards and failing to consistently apply summary judgment standards. Gogel made a prima facie case of retaliation (assisting Ledbetter is protected; Kia's reason, though legitimate, is pretextual). There are factual disputes about Gogel's core job responsibilities (e.g., whether 'preventing unwelcomed activity' included avoiding litigation or only union activity), and the majority improperly resolves these for Kia. She highlighted that Gogel's job description did not explicitly require preventing lawsuits, and the conflicting testimony creates a credibility issue for a jury. Furthermore, Gogel's own EEOC complaint, filed two months before her termination, creates an independent triable issue of fact about pretext, especially when combined with temporal proximity and 'me too' evidence (Tyler's firing, Ledbetter's coercion). The majority's framing, she argued, ignores the full context of Gogel's sustained opposition to discrimination at Kia.
Dissenting - Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge
No, the grant of summary judgment to Kia on Gogel's retaliation claim should be reversed, because material issues of fact exist regarding whether Gogel's alleged advice to Ledbetter constituted protected activity under Title VII and whether Kia’s stated reason for firing Gogel was pretextual. Judge Rosenbaum argued the majority's new rule, which effectively bans HR employees from discussing Title VII remedies, is a devastating blow to Title VII and rewards employers who act in bad faith to obstruct compliance. She contended the majority fails to apply the Rollins balancing test correctly, ignoring 'the purpose of the statute' and 'the need to protect individuals asserting their rights,' and assuming the 'legitimacy' of Kia's demands for loyalty. She detailed Kia's 'sexist horrors' and Gogel's repeated attempts to remedy discrimination, arguing that Gogel acted only after Kia repeatedly frustrated her efforts. Under Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, whether conduct is protected activity is a question of fact unless it's clear as a matter of law that it's unprotected. Given Kia's alleged bad faith, a jury should decide if Gogel's alleged advice was protected. Furthermore, the majority improperly limits its analysis of Gogel's retaliation claim to only her EEOC filing, ignoring her extensive opposition conduct, thereby missing the full context of pretext. Kia's 'investigation' into Gogel's alleged solicitation was suspect, based solely on reports from 'close' friends (Williams and Grimes) who later benefited from Gogel's termination, and who themselves delayed reporting Gogel's alleged misconduct. This, combined with Gogel's denials and the irony of Kia firing Gogel for 'failing to investigate claims' after previously preventing her from doing so, suggests pretext.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limits of Title VII's opposition clause for human resources professionals, emphasizing that their conduct must be 'reasonable' and not undermine core job functions aimed at internal dispute resolution. It reinforces the employer's prerogative to enforce loyalty and trust in sensitive roles, especially where instigating external litigation conflicts with the role's primary purpose. However, the dissents highlight a critical tension: when an employer's internal compliance system is perceived as dysfunctional or actively obstructive, the legitimacy of its demands for 'loyalty' becomes questionable, posing a challenge to balancing employer interests with employees' Title VII rights, particularly for HR personnel uniquely positioned to observe and report systemic discrimination.
