Andrade v. NAACP of Austin
345 S.W.3d 1 (2011)
Rule of Law:
Voters have standing to bring an equal protection claim challenging a voting system that allegedly treats them differently than other voters, but a state's use of a paperless electronic voting system is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction on voting that does not violate equal protection when justified by important state regulatory interests.
Facts:
- The Texas Secretary of State is responsible for certifying voting systems for use in state elections.
- The Secretary certified the eSlate, a paperless direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machine that does not produce a contemporaneous paper record of each individual vote cast.
- Travis County purchased and implemented the eSlate system for in-person voting.
- Sonia Santana, a registered voter in Travis County, is required to use the eSlate system when voting in person.
- Other voters in Texas, including absentee voters in Travis County and voters in other counties, use voting systems that utilize paper ballots.
- A group including the NAACP of Austin, its president Nelson Linder, Sonia Santana, and political candidate David Van Os (the voters) became concerned that the eSlate system was vulnerable to fraud and malfunction, and that its lack of a paper trail prevented a meaningful audit or recount.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of voters, including the NAACP of Austin and Sonia Santana, sued the Texas Secretary of State in a state trial court.
- The lawsuit sought a declaratory judgment that certifying the eSlate system was illegal and an injunction to prohibit its use without a paper trail.
- The Secretary of State filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, claiming the voters lacked standing and the state had sovereign immunity.
- The trial court denied the Secretary's plea and motion.
- The Secretary of State (appellant) appealed the trial court's denial to the intermediate court of appeals.
- A divided court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, agreeing that the voters (appellees) had standing.
- The Secretary of State (petitioner) petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas, the state's highest court, for review, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Texas Secretary of State's certification of a paperless electronic voting system that results in different recount procedures for its users compared to users of paper-based systems violate the Texas Constitution's Equal Protection Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Jefferson
No. The certification of the paperless electronic voting system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction on the right to vote justified by the state's important regulatory interests. First, the court determined that the voters have standing to pursue their equal protection claim because they allege a particularized injury: that the eSlate system treats them differently and provides less protection than voters in other counties or absentee voters who use paper ballots. However, the voters' other statutory and constitutional claims are dismissed for lack of standing as they constitute generalized grievances about the government's lawful conduct. On the merits of the equal protection claim, the court applies the sliding-scale balancing test from Burdick v. Takushi. The court finds that the use of DREs is not a severe restriction on the right to vote, citing their benefits, such as increased accessibility for disabled voters and the reduction of certain types of voter errors (e.g., overvotes). Because the restriction is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, it is justified by the state's important regulatory interests in operating elections efficiently and equitably. The different recount procedures are a necessary consequence of the different technologies, and the choice to certify the eSlate is a reasonable policy decision left to the political branches, not the judiciary.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the judiciary's deferential stance toward legislative and executive choices in election administration technology. It distinguishes between a particularized injury sufficient for standing (unequal treatment among voters) and a non-justiciable generalized grievance (disagreement with government policy). By applying the flexible Burdick balancing test, the court signals that challenges to voting systems based on potential vulnerabilities, rather than proven inaccuracies or discriminatory intent, are unlikely to succeed. This ruling makes it more difficult to legally compel states to adopt specific voting technologies, such as those with voter-verified paper audit trails, leaving such decisions firmly in the realm of policy and legislation.
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