Anderson v. Worstell
492 F. App'x 913 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers do not violate a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right when they fail to take an intoxicated person into protective custody, and that person is subsequently injured by the negligent act of a private third party.
Facts:
- On February 17, 2010, Mitchel Anderson was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Daniel Clayton, after they had been drinking for several hours.
- Officers B. Worstell and C. Calkins of the Colorado Springs Police Department stopped the vehicle.
- After an investigation, the officers arrested Clayton for driving while intoxicated.
- Around 9:30 pm, the officers ordered Anderson, who was heavily intoxicated, confused, and disoriented, to exit the vehicle and leave the scene.
- The officers then impounded the vehicle.
- While attempting to walk home, Anderson was struck by a vehicle driven by a third party.
- As a result of being struck, Anderson sustained serious injuries, including the amputation of his left leg.
Procedural Posture:
- Mitchel Anderson filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against Officers Worstell and Calkins, among others.
- The complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (deprivation of due process rights) and various state tort claims.
- The defendant officers moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.
- The district court (trial court) denied the officers' motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim, concluding that factual disputes regarding Anderson's level of intoxication precluded a grant of qualified immunity at that stage.
- The officers (appellants) filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, with Anderson (appellee) as the opposing party.
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Issue:
Do police officers violate a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right, thereby forfeiting qualified immunity, when they order a heavily intoxicated passenger to leave the scene of a traffic stop, and that passenger is subsequently injured by a negligent third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Murphy, Circuit Judge
No, the officers did not violate a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County established that a state's failure to protect an individual from private harm does not generally constitute a due process violation. The two exceptions to this rule, the 'special relationship' and 'state-created danger' theories, do not apply here. No 'special relationship' existed because Anderson was not in state custody; to the contrary, his complaint is that the officers failed to place him in custody. The 'state-created danger' theory is inapplicable because the harm was caused by the negligent act of a private driver, and the court has clarified this theory does not apply to harms caused by mere negligence. A prior, factually similar case, Hilliard v. City & Cnty. of Denver, also found no clearly established right was violated. Therefore, Anderson failed to meet his burden of showing that the officers violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the significant hurdle of qualified immunity for plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations by police for failure to protect. It narrowly construes the 'state-created danger' exception to the DeShaney rule, explicitly holding that it does not apply to harms caused by a private party's negligence. This precedent makes it exceptionally difficult to hold officers liable under § 1983 for releasing an intoxicated individual who is later harmed in an accident, as opposed to being a victim of intentional violence. The ruling also confirms that state statutes or local policies that may seem to create a duty of care (like an emergency commitment statute) do not independently establish a federal constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
