Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co.
114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813, 1921 Wash. LEXIS 576 (1921)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A penal statute prohibiting discrimination in places of public resort based on race, creed, or color also creates a civil cause of action for damages, including for personal indignity, humiliation, and mental suffering, as such a statute is both penal and remedial in nature.
Facts:
- Pantages Theatre Company, a Washington corporation, owned and operated a theatre in Seattle, charging a fee for admission.
- On July 7, 1919, a friend purchased three box seat tickets for a performance for Mr. Anderson, a Black lawyer, and two other Black individuals.
- When Mr. Anderson and his party presented their tickets for admission to the box seats, an attendant initially refused them, claiming the seats were taken.
- Upon Mr. Anderson’s insistence, another attendant stated that he could not be admitted to that part of the theatre 'in any event' and that he was refused because he was a colored man.
- The attendant became gruff and insulting, stating that 'none of his kind of people could sit in any box seat or on the ground floor of that theatre'.
- The attendant then 'rudely, using no undue force and doing the plaintiff no bodily injury, all without any provocation whatever, push, shove, jerk and force plaintiff through a crowd of people who were standing in the lobby of the theatre out upon the sidewalk'.
- Mr. Anderson conducted himself in a 'seemly and gentlemanly manner' and was well-dressed; his refusal was solely due to his race.
- It was the theatre's policy and practice to refuse admission to box seats, loges, and ground floor seats to all Black people and all Orientals.
Procedural Posture:
- Mr. Anderson (respondent) sued Pantages Theatre Company (appellant) in the trial court for damages related to the refusal of admission and humiliation.
- The trial court found in favor of Mr. Anderson and awarded him $300.
- Pantages Theatre Company (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Washington.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a state penal statute, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations, confer a civil right to be free from such discrimination and allow for the recovery of damages for personal indignity and mental suffering, even if the statute does not explicitly provide for a civil remedy?
Opinions:
Majority - Fullerton, J.
Yes, a state penal statute prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations does confer a civil right to be free from such discrimination and allows for the recovery of damages for personal indignity and mental suffering, even without an explicit civil remedy provision. The court found that while common law might have allowed theatre proprietors to exclude patrons at will, the Washington legislature enacted Rem. Code, § 2686, which makes it a misdemeanor to deny 'the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of any place of public resort... because of race, creed or color.' This statute, though penal in form, is both penal and remedial, conferring individual rights to equal admission. The court reasoned that when a statute imposes a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others, a person who neglects or refuses to perform that duty is liable for any injury or detriment caused, provided the injury is of the kind the statute was intended to prevent. Citing Ferguson v. Gies and In re Debs, the court affirmed that an act can give rise to both criminal prosecution and a civil action for damages. The court clarified that the action was founded in tort, not merely breach of contract (the ticket being a license), because it concerned the denial of a right specially conferred by law and the breach of a public duty. Regarding damages, the court held that 'the personal indignity inflicted, the feeling of humiliation and disgrace engendered, and the consequent mental suffering, are elements of actual damages for which a compensatory award may be made,' especially when coupled with an 'assault upon the person' through the act of being pushed out. The court cited previous cases to support the recovery of such non-pecuniary damages and found the $300 award to be proportionate given the aggravated nature of the indignity in a public setting.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing that a statute primarily criminal in nature can implicitly create a civil cause of action for the benefit of individuals protected by it. It expands the scope of remedies available for statutory violations, affirming that the denial of statutory rights, especially concerning public accommodations, constitutes a tort. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the principle that damages for such torts can include compensation for emotional distress, humiliation, and indignity, not just pecuniary losses, reinforcing the personal nature of the harm caused by discrimination. This precedent would be crucial for future civil rights litigation, allowing victims of discrimination to seek meaningful redress beyond just the cost of admission.
