Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
In a strict products liability action for failure to warn, a manufacturer's liability is limited to risks that were known or scientifically knowable at the time of manufacture and distribution. Consequently, a defendant may introduce 'state-of-the-art' evidence to demonstrate that the particular risk was not knowable at the time.
Facts:
- From 1941 to 1976, Carl Anderson worked as an electrician at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
- In the course of his employment, Anderson was exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing products manufactured by the defendants.
- The products included preformed blocks, cloth, cloth tape, cement, and floor tiles used for insulation aboard ships.
- Anderson was exposed while working in the vicinity of other workers who were removing and installing these products.
- Later in life, Anderson was diagnosed with asbestosis and other lung ailments as a result of his exposure to asbestos.
- Defendants' products, at least for a portion of the time Anderson was exposed, were marketed and sold without warnings regarding the health risks of asbestos.
Procedural Posture:
- Carl Anderson sued several manufacturers of asbestos-containing products in state trial court, alleging strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.
- Prior to trial, Anderson elected to proceed solely on his strict liability cause of action.
- Anderson filed a pre-trial motion to exclude state-of-the-art evidence, which the trial court granted.
- In response, the defendants moved to preclude Anderson from proceeding on a failure-to-warn theory, and the trial court granted their motion.
- The case was tried before a jury only on a design defect theory, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
- Anderson moved for a new trial, arguing the court erred in preventing him from presenting his failure-to-warn case.
- The trial court granted Anderson's motion for a new trial.
- Defendants, as appellants, appealed the order for a new trial to the Court of Appeal, with Anderson as the appellee.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial, holding that state-of-the-art evidence was inadmissible in strict liability failure-to-warn cases.
- The defendants sought review from the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
In a strict products liability action based on a failure to warn, is a defendant permitted to introduce state-of-the-art evidence showing that the risk of harm was scientifically unknowable at the time of manufacture and distribution?
Opinions:
Majority - Panelli, J.
Yes. A defendant in a strict products liability action based upon an alleged failure to warn may present evidence of the state of the art. The court holds that knowledge or knowability of a risk is a necessary component of a strict liability claim based on a failure to warn. The purpose of strict liability is to protect consumers from defective products, but it was never intended to make manufacturers the absolute insurers of their products' safety. A manufacturer cannot be held liable for failing to warn of a danger that was scientifically unknowable at the time the product was distributed. While strict liability avoids focusing on the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct (as in negligence), the duty to warn is premised on the existence of a knowable risk. The proper standard requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant failed to warn of a risk that was known or knowable in light of the best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time, not whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer.
Concurring - Broussard, J.
Yes. While state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in a failure-to-warn case, this holding should be understood as narrow in scope. The author emphasizes that such evidence is relevant because a warning presupposes that a risk is knowable. However, he clarifies that state-of-the-art evidence would not necessarily be relevant or admissible in a strict liability action based on a design defect claim under the 'consumer expectation' test. Under that theory, a manufacturer is liable if a product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect, regardless of what the manufacturer knew or could have known about the specific danger.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mosk, J.
Yes, but only under limited circumstances. The author concurs with the judgment to grant a new trial but dissents from the majority's reasoning, arguing that it improperly infuses negligence concepts into strict liability doctrine, which should focus on the product, not the manufacturer's conduct. He criticizes the majority's reliance on Brown v. Superior Court, a prescription drug case he views as a narrow public policy exception. He proposes a bright-line rule for failure-to-warn cases: if a plaintiff can prove the defendant had actual knowledge of the risk, state-of-the-art evidence should be irrelevant and inadmissible; if the plaintiff can only prove the defendant should have known of the risk (constructive knowledge), then the defendant should be permitted to introduce contrary scientific and state-of-the-art evidence.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'knowability' requirement for strict liability failure-to-warn claims in California, aligning the state with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. By doing so, the court prevents strict liability from becoming absolute liability, ensuring manufacturers are not held responsible for scientifically unknowable risks. The case establishes a crucial distinction: while the manufacturer's reasonableness is irrelevant (unlike in negligence), the objective state of scientific knowledge at the time of distribution is a central element of the claim. This precedent significantly impacts toxic tort and other latent injury cases by allowing defendants to argue that they cannot be held liable for failing to warn of dangers that were not discovered until years after the product was sold.
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