ANDERSON
16 I. & N. Dec. 596 (1978)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Economic detriment resulting from an alien's return to a country with a lower standard of living does not, by itself, constitute 'extreme hardship' for the purpose of suspension of deportation. To meet the 'extreme hardship' standard, economic difficulties must be combined with other significant adverse factors, such as advanced age, severe illness, or substantial family ties in the United States.
Facts:
- Anderson, a 55-year-old native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant visitor and remained longer than permitted.
- During his eight years in the U.S., Anderson worked as a self-employed carpenter.
- Prior to arriving in the U.S., Anderson had worked as a highly-regarded carpenter for the Dominican government.
- Anderson's wife, who was also in the United States without legal status, suffered from psychological maladjustments which Anderson claimed he could not afford to treat in the Dominican Republic.
- Anderson's ten children and all of his siblings resided in the Dominican Republic, while he had several cousins living in the United States.
Procedural Posture:
- During deportation proceedings before an immigration judge, Anderson applied for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
- The immigration judge found Anderson deportable, denied his application for suspension of deportation, and granted him the alternative relief of voluntary departure.
- Anderson, the respondent, appealed the immigration judge's denial of his suspension of deportation application to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an alien's deportation to a country with a depressed economy, which would result in financial difficulties and a lower standard of living, constitute 'extreme hardship' under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when not combined with other significant adverse factors?
Opinions:
Majority - Milhollan, Chairman
No. An alien's deportation to a country with a depressed economy does not, by itself, constitute 'extreme hardship' under the Act. The Board reasoned that while economic and political conditions in an alien's home country are relevant, they are not dispositive. Because the United States enjoys a higher standard of living than most nations, considering economic detriment alone would mandate relief in a vast majority of cases, a result Congress did not intend. The Board held that 'extreme hardship' is established only when economic detriment combines with other factors like advanced age, severe illness, or strong family ties in the U.S. In Anderson's case, his significant family ties were in the Dominican Republic, not the U.S., his skills were transferable, and his wife's condition could be treated at home, albeit with financial sacrifice. Therefore, the adverse factors did not collectively rise to the level of 'extreme hardship' required for the extraordinary relief of suspension of deportation.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that 'extreme hardship' for immigration relief is a high and fact-specific standard that cannot be met solely by evidence of economic disadvantage. By clarifying that economic factors must be compounded by other personal circumstances like health and U.S. family ties, the Board reinforced the discretionary and exceptional nature of suspension of deportation. This precedent prevents the 'extreme hardship' provision from becoming a remedy for global economic disparities, ensuring it is reserved for aliens with compelling, multi-faceted claims. The case remains a foundational authority for adjudicating hardship claims in various forms of immigration relief.
