An opinion was released in case 22-3042, USA v. Couy Griffin
Not specified in provided text (2024)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) for knowingly entering or remaining in a restricted building or grounds requires proof that the defendant knew the area was "posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted" and that they lacked lawful authority, but does not require proof that the defendant knew the specific reason for the restriction, such as the presence of a Secret Service protectee.
Facts:
- Couy Griffin, an elected Commissioner and leader of "Cowboys for Trump," traveled to Washington, D.C. to attend the "Stop the Steal" rally on January 6, 2021.
- On January 5, 2021, Griffin recorded a video in front of the U.S. Capitol, with fencing visible, declaring his trust that Vice President Pence would "do the right thing" regarding electoral college votes.
- In anticipation of the rally and certification, the Secret Service coordinated with U.S. Capitol Police to prepare for Vice President Pence’s visit by establishing a secure perimeter around the Capitol grounds, using temporary fencing (bike racks and snow fencing) and signs reading "Area Closed by Order of the United States Capitol Police Board."
- On January 6, 2021, Griffin attended the "Stop the Steal" rally and then followed the crowd as it proceeded toward the U.S. Capitol.
- Around 2:31 p.m., Griffin used a parked bicycle to boost himself over a five-foot stone wall separating a sidewalk from the Capitol’s west front lawn, landing on trampled snow fencing, to enter the restricted grounds.
- Once inside the grounds, Griffin ascended to the base of the inaugural stage by scaling two more walls with assistance, stating, "we’re in now," and joking about needing a face mask to obscure his identity.
- Griffin then managed to get onto the inaugural stage, borrowed a bullhorn to attempt to lead rioters in prayer, and remained on the stage and nearby terrace until at least 4:48 p.m., amidst law enforcement efforts to control the mob.
- The mass security breaches on January 6, including Griffin’s presence, halted the certification of electoral votes and forced Vice President Pence, his wife, and daughter to shelter under Secret Service protection at an underground loading dock within the Capitol complex for four to five hours.
Procedural Posture:
- Federal prosecutors charged Couy Griffin with two misdemeanors: (1) entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1), and (2) disorderly and disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2).
- Griffin opted for a bench trial before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The district court rejected Griffin’s argument that Section 1752’s “knowingly” condition required knowledge of a Secret Service protectee’s presence, finding it sufficient that the area was restricted because of Vice President Pence’s presence and that Griffin knew he shouldn’t be there.
- The district court convicted Griffin of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) but acquitted him on the § 1752(a)(2) charge, finding reasonable doubt as to whether he intended for his conduct to disrupt the election certification or engaged in disorderly conduct.
- The district court sentenced Griffin to fourteen days of incarceration, with credit for time served, and one year of supervised release.
- Griffin timely filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (appellant), with the United States of America as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for "knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority" under 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) require the government to prove that the defendant knew the specific reason for the restriction, such as the presence of a Secret Service protectee?
Opinions:
Majority - Pillard
No, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) for knowingly entering or remaining in a restricted building or grounds without lawful authority does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew the specific reason for the restriction, such as the presence of a Secret Service protectee. The Court held that "knowingly" applies to the fact that the area is "posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted" and that the defendant lacks lawful authority, but not to the underlying facts (like the presence of a protectee) that establish Congress's authority to regulate. Relying on United States v. Feola, the Court reasoned that the specific requirements of Section 1752(c)(1) (e.g., presence of a Secret Service protectee) are "jurisdictional only" elements. These elements connect the offense to Congress's legislative power without needing to be known by the defendant. The Court found that extending the knowledge requirement to such details would be grammatically unnatural given the statute's lengthy and nested definitions. Furthermore, requiring proof of a defendant's knowledge of a protectee's presence would "pointlessly hinder the Secret Service’s ability to defend national leaders," contravening the statute's protective purpose. The Court noted that the act of knowingly trespassing on a restricted area is inherently wrongful, regardless of whether the defendant knows the specific federal nexus, thus posing no risk of unfairness.
Dissenting - Katsas
Yes, a conviction for "knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority" under 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the specific reason for the restriction, such as the presence of a Secret Service protectee. Judge Katsas argued that, as a matter of ordinary English grammar and Supreme Court precedent (Flores-Figueroa, McFadden, Rehaif), the adverb "knowingly" naturally applies to all subsequently listed elements of the crime, including the entire statutory definition of "restricted building or grounds." He stated that the statutory history of Section 1752, particularly its original enactment, supports extending the mens rea to the protectee's presence, and subsequent amendments were merely for "legislative housekeeping." The dissent emphasized the strong presumption of mens rea in criminal statutes, which applies not only to separate wrongful from innocent conduct but also to distinguish between "greater and lesser evils." Trespassing in an area where a Secret Service protectee is present is significantly more culpable than simple trespass. Judge Katsas distinguished Feola, arguing that the presence of a protectee is not "jurisdictional only" because it serves a substantive role in defining the behavior Congress sought to punish, directly reflecting the increased wrongfulness and severity of the conduct, which should trigger a knowledge requirement.
Analysis:
This ruling significantly clarifies the mens rea standard for a critical federal security statute, thereby lowering the evidentiary burden for prosecutors in cases involving unauthorized entry into protected areas. By deeming the protectee's presence a "jurisdictional only" element, the decision prioritizes the practical needs of the Secret Service for immediate and effective security enforcement over an individual's specific knowledge of the underlying federal protectee. The decision streamlines prosecutions for similar federal trespass offenses, especially in dynamic or chaotic situations like the January 6 Capitol riot, where detailed knowledge of specific protectees cannot be readily proven. It also reinforces the broader principle in criminal law that facts establishing federal jurisdiction may not require a specific mens rea if the underlying conduct is already wrongful.
