Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
809 F.2d 979, 33 Cont. Cas. Fed. 74,884, 55 U.S.L.W. 2363 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
The separation of powers doctrine is not violated when Congress authorizes an officer of the legislative branch to temporarily stay the executive branch's procurement process, as this power is incidental to Congress's legitimate investigatory and oversight functions and does not constitute an impermissible usurpation of or interference with a core executive function.
Facts:
- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Army) issued an 'Invitation for Bids' for a sewer repair and cleaning project at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
- Ameron, Inc. submitted the lowest bid for the project.
- The Army did not award the contract to Ameron, determining that Ameron's bid bond did not comply with the requirements in the invitation.
- Ameron filed a formal bid protest with the Comptroller General pursuant to the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).
- Believing CICA's stay provisions were unconstitutional, the Army proceeded with the contract execution despite the pending protest, which would normally trigger an automatic stay.
Procedural Posture:
- Ameron, Inc. sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking an injunction to enforce CICA’s stay provisions.
- The district court, as the court of first instance, held that CICA was constitutional and granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Ameron.
- The Army, as appellant, appealed the injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- An appellate panel initially affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the Comptroller General was not an agent of the legislative branch.
- The Army filed a petition for panel or en banc rehearing.
- The appellate court deferred action on the petition pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar.
- After the Supreme Court held in Bowsher that the Comptroller General is a legislative agent, the Third Circuit panel granted rehearing to reconsider the case in light of that decision.
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Issue:
Does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) violate the separation of powers doctrine by authorizing the Comptroller General, an officer of the legislative branch, to temporarily stay the government contract procurement process pending the resolution of a bid protest?
Opinions:
Majority - Becker
No, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The power granted to the Comptroller General to temporarily stay the procurement process is not an unconstitutional execution of the law but rather a permissible incident of Congress's core legislative powers of investigation and oversight. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar, the Comptroller General is definitively an agent of the legislative branch, meaning he cannot exercise executive power. However, the authority under CICA is not executive in nature. The stay provisions do not allow the Comptroller General to decide what to buy, from whom, or at what price; they merely control the timing of the process to allow for a meaningful investigation into potential procurement law violations. Furthermore, the executive branch retains significant authority, including the power to override the stay in 'urgent and compelling circumstances.' Applying the balancing test from Nixon v. GSA, any potential disruption to the executive's function is minimal and is justified by Congress's overriding interest in preventing waste and ensuring compliance with federal procurement laws.
Concurring - Garth
No, CICA's stay provision is constitutional. The crucial distinction between this case and Bowsher v. Synar lies in the degree of intrusion into the executive's authority. In Bowsher, the Comptroller General was given the substantial power to mandate budget cuts, a clear usurpation of an executive function. In contrast, the power at issue here—to temporarily stay a contract award for the duration of an investigation—is almost trivial and amounts to a de minimis intrusion. Citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, such a minor encroachment on a coordinate branch does not rise to the level of a separation of powers violation. The analysis should focus empirically on the magnitude of the specific power being challenged, and in this case, the stay power is a limited and necessary mechanism to make an otherwise unobjectionable oversight procedure workable.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the separation of powers doctrine in the wake of Bowsher v. Synar. It establishes that not every delegation of authority to a legislative officer that impacts the executive branch constitutes an unconstitutional 'execution of the law.' The decision distinguishes between core executive powers and ancillary powers that are incidental to Congress's constitutional oversight and investigatory functions. By applying the Nixon v. GSA balancing test, the court provides a framework for future cases, indicating that minimal intrusions on the executive branch can be justified by substantial legislative interests, particularly when the executive retains override authority. This precedent protects Congress's ability to conduct effective oversight without fundamentally altering the executive's power to implement the laws.
