American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency
175 F.3d 1027 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
When Congress statutorily delegates authority to an administrative agency, the agency's interpretation of that statute must be based on an 'intelligible principle' that provides a determinate standard for its actions. A statutory directive to protect public health with an 'adequate margin of safety' is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power if the agency fails to articulate a determinate criterion for how it will determine what level of protection is requisite.
Facts:
- The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set and periodically revise National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for certain air pollutants.
- The Act requires that primary NAAQS be set at a level 'requisite to protect the public health' with an 'adequate margin of safety.'
- The EPA identified ozone and particulate matter (PM) as non-threshold pollutants, meaning they have some potential for adverse health effects at any concentration above zero.
- In July 1997, the EPA issued final rules revising the NAAQS for ozone and PM, making them significantly more stringent than the existing standards.
- The new ozone standard was lowered, and a new standard for 'fine' particulate matter (PM2.5) was created, while the standard for 'coarse' particulate matter (PM10) was retained.
- American Trucking Associations, Inc., along with other industry groups and several states, believed the new standards were based on an unconstitutional grant of legislative power to the EPA, as the agency had not defined what level of public health risk was acceptable.
Procedural Posture:
- The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated new National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter.
- American Trucking Associations, Inc., along with various states and other industry groups (Petitioners), filed numerous petitions for review of the new NAAQS in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
- The EPA was the respondent in these actions.
- The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states intervened in support of the EPA.
- The various petitions for review were consolidated before the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act, which allows it to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for non-threshold pollutants without articulating a determinate principle for deciding how much risk to public health is permissible, constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because the agency has failed to articulate any 'intelligible principle' to constrain its discretion in setting air quality standards. The Clean Air Act's mandate to set standards 'requisite to protect the public health' with an 'adequate margin of safety' provides no guidance for determining the permissible level of risk for non-threshold pollutants, where any level above zero poses some risk. The factors the EPA considers—such as the nature and severity of health effects, the size of the sensitive population, and the degree of uncertainty—are reasonable but fail to provide a determinate criterion for drawing a line. This lack of a clear standard gives the EPA unbounded discretion to set a standard anywhere between zero and a level causing catastrophic harm. The court remanded the case for the EPA to develop a constitutional construction of the statute by articulating an intelligible principle to guide its standard-setting.
Dissenting - Tatel
No. The EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act is a constitutional delegation of legislative power, as the statute provides an intelligible principle that appropriately cabins the agency's discretion. The nondelegation doctrine has been interpreted permissively for over half a century, upholding broader delegations than the one at issue here. The Act's directive to set standards 'requisite to protect the public health' based on the 'latest scientific knowledge' provides a sufficient principle. The EPA's discretion is further constrained by the statutory requirement to base its decisions on air quality criteria and the recommendations of the independent Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC). In this case, the EPA provided rational explanations for its choices, setting the ozone standard above natural background levels and where effects are not merely 'transient and reversible,' and setting the particulate matter standard at the lowest level where statistically significant health effects were confidently observed in epidemiological studies.
Analysis:
This case marked a significant, albeit temporary, revival of the nondelegation doctrine, which had been largely dormant since the 1930s. The D.C. Circuit's decision signaled a new judicial willingness to scrutinize broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies, demanding that agencies articulate clear, binding principles for their discretionary choices. While the Supreme Court later reversed this specific nondelegation holding in Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. (2001), the case forced a critical re-examination of how agencies justify complex regulatory decisions. It continues to influence administrative law by emphasizing the importance of reasoned decision-making and highlighting the constitutional tension between the need for expert agency action and the principle that Congress alone holds legislative power.
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