American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell
951 S.W.2d 420 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under Texas product liability law, the "common knowledge" defense negates a manufacturer's duty to warn of a product's general health risks known to the community, but it does not negate the duty to warn of a specific, distinct danger, such as addiction, that was not commonly known at the time of the consumer's initial exposure.
Facts:
- In 1952, nineteen-year-old Wiley Grinnell began smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes, manufactured by the American Tobacco Company.
- Approximately one year later, Grinnell switched to Pall Mall cigarettes, also manufactured by American.
- During the 1950s, American Tobacco and the broader tobacco industry released public statements asserting that smoking was not injurious to health and that no proof linked smoking to lung cancer.
- Grinnell smoked for approximately thirty-three years.
- In July 1985, Grinnell was diagnosed with lung cancer.
- Less than a year after his diagnosis, Grinnell died.
Procedural Posture:
- Wiley Grinnell filed a lawsuit against The American Tobacco Company in a Texas trial court.
- After Grinnell's death, his family continued the suit, adding wrongful death and survival claims.
- American Tobacco filed several motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, dismissing the Grinnells' entire suit.
- The Grinnells, as appellants, appealed to the Texas court of appeals.
- The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for trial.
- American Tobacco Company, as petitioner, appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a cigarette manufacturer have a duty to warn consumers about the addictive nature of cigarettes even if the general health risks of smoking were common knowledge?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Cornyn
Yes, the cigarette manufacturer had a duty to warn about addiction. The court holds that while historical evidence demonstrates the general dangers of smoking, such as lung cancer, were widely known and understood by the community when Grinnell began smoking in 1952, the specific danger of nicotine addiction was not common knowledge at that time. The court differentiates between the general harms of a product and its addictive properties, noting that addiction is a distinct danger that multiplies the likelihood of the ultimate injury. Citing the 1988 Surgeon General's report as evidence that understanding of nicotine addiction is relatively recent, the court concludes that American Tobacco did not establish as a matter of law that addiction was a commonly known risk in 1952. Therefore, while the 'common knowledge' defense bars failure-to-warn claims based on general health risks, it does not bar claims based on the failure to warn about addiction for the pre-1969 period.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Hecht
No, the cigarette manufacturer should not have a duty to warn about addiction when general health risks are commonly known. The distinction between addiction and habit is a scientific nuance that is meaningless to the ordinary consumer, for whom it has always been common knowledge that smoking is very difficult to quit. The risk of addiction is subsumed within the far greater and commonly known risk of fatal disease like cancer. It is illogical to allow recovery for a plaintiff who was undeterred by the risk of death but claims he would have been deterred by a warning about addiction.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Enoch
No, the 'common knowledge' defense should bar all failure-to-warn claims because the general, commonly known health risk of cigarettes is that they can kill you, which encompasses the risk of addiction. The majority creates an unworkable and vague distinction by parsing out addiction as a separate risk, which conflicts with precedent. This approach undermines the common knowledge doctrine by allowing plaintiffs to claim ignorance of a specific risk despite acknowledging awareness of the ultimate danger. Furthermore, the claim regarding pesticide residue is properly a design defect claim, not a manufacturing defect claim, and should have been dismissed along with the other design defect claims.
Analysis:
This decision is legally significant for refining the application of the 'common knowledge' defense in product liability. By separating a product's general, widely understood dangers from specific, lesser-known risks like addiction, the court created a new avenue for plaintiffs to pursue claims against manufacturers of inherently dangerous products. This holding requires a more granular analysis of what the public knew about a specific risk at a particular point in time, rather than allowing a general awareness of harm to serve as a complete defense. The case established a critical precedent in tobacco litigation, allowing addiction-based failure-to-warn theories to proceed for the period before federal law preempted such claims.
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