American Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes
2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 10332, 960 So.2d 830, 26 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 631 (2007)
Rule of Law:
For a defamation claim against a corporation based on intra-corporate communications, statements made between executive or managerial employees do not constitute actionable publication, and communications to other employees may be protected by a conditional privilege if made in good faith on a matter of common interest or duty.
Facts:
- Arthur Geddes, an aircraft mechanic for American Airlines, and his co-workers began storing personal computers in a closet near their break room.
- On June 19, 2001, Geddes found his computer cabinet moved and reported to supervisor Garnett Pennant that he suspected mechanic Mike Coombs.
- On June 25, 2001, mechanic Ernest Suarez complained about the computers, leading to an argument with Geddes, after which Suarez reported to supervisor Jose De Fran and manager Pedro Lau that Geddes had threatened to "cut out his intestines" while holding a two-foot metal bar.
- De Fran and Lau began an investigation into Suarez's claim, interviewing witnesses and Geddes, then suspending Geddes pending further investigation.
- Human resources manager Terry Meenan took over the investigation, interviewing Geddes (who admitted to using harsh language and saying "If you touch my computer, you'll see what happens"), another mechanic (Eduardo Romero), and Suarez again.
- On July 17, 2001, Meenan met with Geddes to communicate the results of her investigation, which resulted in Geddes being issued a "first advisory" as part of American's progressive discipline policy.
- Later that day, Meenan met with other mechanics who were asking questions and circulating rumors about Geddes' suspension, refusing to discuss particulars due to confidentiality but generally addressing company workplace policies.
- Meenan was aware that Geddes had previously sued American Airlines for race discrimination in federal court in 1997, where American prevailed and obtained a judgment against Geddes for fees and costs.
Procedural Posture:
- Arthur Geddes sued his employer, American Airlines, Inc., and its human resources manager, Terry Meenan, in trial court for defamation and American for negligent supervision.
- The case was tried to a jury.
- The jury returned a verdict finding that both American Airlines and Terry Meenan had published a defamatory statement about Geddes.
- The jury specifically found that Meenan's statements were true, uttered in good faith, privileged, and made without malice.
- The jury found that American's statements were the exact opposite: false, not in good faith, not privileged, and made with malice.
- The jury also found American Airlines guilty of negligent supervision.
- The jury attributed 90% negligence to American Airlines and 10% to Geddes, and awarded total damages of $100,000.
- The trial court entered a final judgment on this verdict in favor of Geddes against American Airlines.
- American Airlines, Inc., as appellant, appealed to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an employer's internal communication during an employee disciplinary investigation, or subsequent discussion with other employees about the investigation, constitute actionable publication of a defamatory statement if the communications are made between managerial employees or, if to non-managerial employees, are subject to a conditional privilege?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
No, an employer's internal communication during an employee disciplinary investigation or subsequent discussion with other employees does not constitute actionable publication if made between managerial employees or if subject to a conditional privilege. To recover in a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant published false and defamatory statements without reasonable care, causing actual damage. A defamatory statement is not actionable until it is "published" or communicated to a third person; statements made solely to the person alleging defamation do not qualify. When a corporation is the alleged defamer, statements made to its own executive or managerial employees are considered "the corporation talking to itself" and thus lack the essential element of publication to a third party. This principle excludes written or oral communications between managerial personnel such as Garnett Pennant, Jose De Fran, Pedro Lau, Mike Smith, and Luther Brewster. Furthermore, one who publishes defamatory matter is not liable if the publication occurs on an occasion that makes it conditionally privileged, provided the privilege is not abused. A communication made in good faith on any subject matter by one having an interest or duty, to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, is privileged. The court found that statements made to non-managerial American personnel were either directed to co-workers identified as witnesses (an integral part of the investigation) or other maintenance department employees who had an interest in the employer's disciplinary practices and workplace safety. Therefore, these statements were conditionally privileged. Since no actionable claim of defamation was established, the claim for negligent supervision, which was based on the alleged defamation, also fails.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits corporate liability for defamation stemming from internal communications during employee investigations. It clarifies that communications among a corporation's managerial employees do not constitute "publication" for defamation purposes, treating the corporation as a single entity in such exchanges. Furthermore, the ruling broadly applies conditional privilege to statements made to other employees who have a legitimate interest in the investigation or workplace safety. This provides a crucial defense for employers conducting internal inquiries, allowing them to investigate misconduct and discuss findings within the organization without undue fear of defamation claims, provided such communications are made in good faith and without malice.
