Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
391 U.S. 308 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
When a privately-owned shopping center is the functional equivalent of a public municipal business district, a state may not use its general trespass laws to wholly prohibit peaceful picketing that is directly related to the shopping center's operations, as such a prohibition violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Facts:
- Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (Logan) owned a large shopping center, the Logan Valley Mall, which was freely accessible to the general public.
- Weis Markets, Inc. (Weis) opened a supermarket within the mall, employing a completely nonunion staff.
- Shortly after opening, Weis posted signs on its building prohibiting trespassing or soliciting on its porch or parking lot.
- Members of Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590, who were not employees of Weis, began peacefully picketing the Weis store.
- The pickets carried signs stating that Weis was nonunion and that its employees did not receive union wages or benefits.
- The picketing occurred almost entirely within the mall's privately-owned property, specifically in the parcel pickup area and adjacent parking lot in front of the Weis store.
Procedural Posture:
- Logan Valley Plaza and Weis Markets sued the Amalgamated Food Employees Union in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Pennsylvania.
- The trial court issued an ex parte injunction prohibiting the union from picketing on the shopping center's property.
- Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court made the injunction indefinite, reasoning that the picketing constituted a trespass on private property.
- The union (petitioners) appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction solely on the ground that the union's conduct was a trespass.
- The union successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state court injunction that prohibits peaceful labor picketing on the private property of a shopping center, which is generally open to the public, violate the picketers' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of expression?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes, the injunction violates the picketers' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because a shopping center serves as the community business block and is freely accessible to the public, a state may not use its trespass laws to wholly exclude members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner consonant with the use to which the property is put. The Court reasoned that the Logan Valley Mall was the functional equivalent of the business district in Marsh v. Alabama, a case involving a company-owned town. Just as the company in Marsh could not prohibit the distribution of religious literature on its sidewalks, the owners of the shopping center here cannot prohibit peaceful picketing related to a store's labor practices. Forcing the picketers to the public berms 350-500 feet away would render their message ineffective and does not serve as a reasonable alternative, as the message is specifically targeted at the patrons of the Weis store within the center. The Court concluded that the more an owner opens up their property for public use, the more their property rights are circumscribed by the constitutional rights of those who use it.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
Yes, the injunction violates the First Amendment. Although the mall is not fully dedicated to public use like a company town, the owners have opened it to public uses for commercial purposes and cannot use the shield of 'private property' to prohibit constitutionally protected expression related to that business. Picketing is 'free speech plus' physical activity, and while the physical aspects can be reasonably regulated to prevent interference with customers and business operations, they cannot be banned entirely. The state courts are capable of fashioning a decree that protects the business while still allowing the union to effectively exercise its First Amendment rights close to the target of its protest.
Dissenting - Justice Black
No, the injunction does not violate the First Amendment. The majority's reliance on Marsh v. Alabama is misplaced because a shopping center with a few commercial establishments bears no resemblance to a complete, self-sufficient company town with residences, streets, and municipal services. The property is private, and the owners' invitation to the public is limited to the purpose of shopping, not for use as a public forum for picketing. The Constitution protects private property rights, and the Court has no authority to take a portion of Weis's property—specifically its crucial parcel pickup zone—and give it to pickets to use for protests. Allowing picketing in the pickup zone is as disruptive as allowing it at the checkout counters, and the injunction protecting this private area should have been upheld.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
The Court should not have reached the First Amendment question and should have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. The case is more appropriately viewed as a labor dispute that likely falls under the pre-emption doctrine, giving the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) exclusive jurisdiction. However, because the petitioners failed to properly raise the pre-emption issue in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to decide it. By creating a rigid constitutional rule in a field where Congress has established a detailed statutory scheme for labor relations, the Court risks disrupting the delicate balance struck by federal labor law. Deciding this case on constitutional grounds is an inappropriate judicial intervention into a complex regulatory area.
Dissenting - Justice White
No, the injunction is constitutional. The right to picket a business typically exists on public streets, which are open to all for communication. The Logan Valley Plaza is not a town; it is a private collection of stores where the public is invited only to do business. The driveways and sidewalks are not dedicated for general public use like parades or protests. The majority's 'functional equivalent' rationale is a dangerous expansion that could license pickets to enter any private property open to customers. The First Amendment bars government interference with speech, but it does not compel a private property owner to dedicate their property for others' expressive uses.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expanded the 'public function' doctrine from Marsh v. Alabama, applying it beyond company towns to privately-owned shopping centers. It established that when private property takes on the characteristics of a traditional public forum, it may be subject to First Amendment speech protections, at least for speech related to the property's use. This ruling provided a constitutional basis for expressive activities in the burgeoning suburban shopping malls that were replacing traditional downtown business districts. However, the precedent was short-lived; the Supreme Court later narrowed its scope and ultimately overruled it in Hudgens v. NLRB (1976), holding that labor picketing in a shopping center is governed by federal labor statutes, not the First Amendment.
