Alteiri v. Colasso
168 Conn. 329, 1975 Conn. LEXIS 957, 362 A.2d 798 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant who intends to commit an assault on one person is liable for battery if their act results in a harmful physical contact to another, unintended person.
Facts:
- The minor plaintiff, Richard Alteiri, was playing in a backyard.
- The defendant, John Colasso, threw a rock into the yard.
- Colasso's intent in throwing the rock was to scare a person other than Alteiri.
- Colasso did not intend to strike Alteiri or any other person.
- The rock thrown by Colasso struck Alteiri in the right eye.
- Alteiri suffered severe, painful, and permanent injuries as a result of being struck.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Alteiri and his mother sued John Colasso for battery in a trial court.
- Colasso pleaded a special defense, arguing the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for negligence.
- At trial, the court denied Colasso's motion to offer proof regarding the statute of limitations and instructed the jury to disregard the defense.
- The jury, through interrogatories, found that Colasso threw the stone with the intent to scare someone other than Alteiri, but did not intend to strike anyone and was not negligent.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Alteiri and his mother.
- The trial court denied defendant Colasso's motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
- Colasso, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the reviewing court.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of transferred intent make a defendant liable for an intentional battery when they intend to cause apprehension of harm in one person but unintentionally cause harmful contact with another person?
Opinions:
Majority - Loiselle, J.
Yes. A defendant is liable for battery under the doctrine of transferred intent. The principle of transferred intent applies not only when an act intended for one person harms another, but also when an act intended to cause one tort (like assault) results in another (like battery). In this case, the defendant's intent to cause an apprehension of bodily harm in a third person (an assault) is sufficient to establish the intent element for the resulting battery against the plaintiff. It is not essential that the precise injury which occurred be the one intended; the law holds that the intent to commit the wrongful act transfers from the intended victim and the intended tort to the actual victim and the resulting tort. Therefore, the jury's finding that the defendant intended to scare someone else provided a legally sufficient basis for a verdict of wilful battery against the plaintiff.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the application of the transferred intent doctrine in tort law, clarifying its scope significantly. The court confirms that intent can transfer not only between different unintended victims but also between different intentional torts, specifically from an intended assault to a resulting battery. This precedent broadens liability for intentional acts, preventing a defendant from escaping responsibility for battery by claiming they only intended to frighten someone, not make physical contact. It ensures that victims who are harmed as a direct result of an intentional, wrongful act have a remedy, even if they were not the direct target of the perpetrator's original intent.
