Alsup v. Montoya
488 S.W.2d 725 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A provision in a will that imposes a disabling restraint which completely removes the power of a life tenant to alienate a legal life estate is void as inconsistent with the nature of the estate and contrary to public policy.
Facts:
- In 1920, W. C. Alsup died, leaving a will that devised three separate farms to his three daughters for the duration of their lives, creating legal life estates.
- The will stipulated that after the daughters' deaths, the properties would pass to their children or their children's heirs (the remaindermen).
- The will contained an explicit clause stating that the land could not be sold or alienated during the daughters' lives and that no court could order its sale for reinvestment.
- By 1924, the entire family, including the three daughters who were life tenants, had moved to California.
- For over fifty years, the farms were rented out or share-cropped, leading to a state of disrepair, including antiquated buildings, fences needing rebuilding, and deteriorated soil fertility.
- The income generated for the life tenants from the farms was substantially less than a reasonable return based on the properties' current market value, which was in excess of $100,000.
Procedural Posture:
- The devisees under W. C. Alsup's will (his three daughters and two adult grandchildren) filed a complaint as complainants in the Chancery Court.
- The minor great-grandchildren of W. C. Alsup were named as defendants, individually and as representatives of all possible remaindermen.
- The complainants sought a court order to abrogate the will's restraint upon alienation and sell the land for reinvestment, arguing both a material change in conditions and that the restraint was void from its inception.
- The case was submitted to the Chancellor (the trial court judge) upon a stipulation of facts.
- The Chancellor found that a material change in conditions had occurred, declared the restraint on alienation invalid, and ordered the land to be sold for reinvestment.
- The defendants, through their guardian ad litem, appealed the Chancellor's decree to the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is a provision in a will that completely prohibits the life tenants of a legal life estate from selling or alienating the property void and unenforceable?
Opinions:
Majority - Erby L. Jenkins, Special Justice
Yes, a provision in a will that completely prohibits the life tenants of a legal life estate from selling or alienating the property is void. The court adopted the nearly unanimous rule that any restraint which wholly removes the power of a life tenant to alienate a legal estate is void. The court distinguished this case, involving a legal life estate, from prior precedent like Keeling v. Keeling, which upheld a restraint on an equitable life estate held in a trust. The court reasoned that enforcing the testator's fifty-year-old directive under drastically changed circumstances—the family's relocation, the property's deterioration, and poor financial return—would frustrate his primary intent to provide for his daughters. Concluding the restraint was void, the court also affirmed the Chancellor's power to order a sale of the entire fee for reinvestment, as it was manifestly advantageous to all parties, including the remaindermen.
Analysis:
This decision formally aligns Tennessee law with the overwhelming majority view in American property law, as reflected in the Restatement of Property, by establishing a per se rule against disabling restraints on legal life estates. The ruling creates a clear distinction between restraints on legal estates (void) and those on equitable estates held in trust (potentially valid), providing critical guidance for estate planners. By emphasizing the court's inherent equitable power to adapt to changed circumstances to fulfill a testator's presumed intent, the case limits the power of a 'dead hand' to control property in ways that harm the living beneficiaries and contravene public policy favoring the alienability of land.
