Allison v. Powell
333 Pa. Super. 48, 1984 Pa. Super. LEXIS 6085, 481 A.2d 1215 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The mere commencement of a partition action by a joint tenant is insufficient to sever a joint tenancy with right of survivorship; severance only occurs upon a final, irrevocable act, such as a final judgment or an executed, enforceable agreement, before the joint tenant's death.
Facts:
- Harold N. Allison and Robert O. and Mary Jane Powell co-owned real estate in Chester County as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
- On November 4, 1981, Allison's attorney sent a letter to the Powells' attorney stating that Allison would accept $20,000 in cash for his interest in the property.
- The letter also inquired about the timeframe the Powells would need to secure the funds.
- Harold Allison died on January 10, 1982.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 31, 1981, Harold Allison filed a complaint in equity in the trial court seeking to partition the real estate.
- Following Allison's death, his executrix was substituted as the party plaintiff.
- The Powells filed an answer and subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that title passed to them by right of survivorship upon Allison's death.
- The trial court granted the Powells' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint.
- Allison's executrix, as appellant, appealed the trial court's order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does the mere filing of an action to partition real estate by one joint tenant sever a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, if that tenant dies before a final judgment is entered?
Opinions:
Majority - Wieand, J.
No. The mere filing of a partition action is insufficient to sever a joint tenancy because the plaintiff can withdraw from the action at any time before a final judgment. Severance requires an irrevocable act that destroys one of the four unities of joint tenancy. The court, citing Sheridan v. Lucey, reasoned that an act of severance must be a sufficient manifestation that the actor is unable to retreat from the position. Because a partition action can be discontinued, it is not an irrevocable act. Therefore, if a joint tenant dies during the pendency of the action, the right of survivorship operates, and the decedent's interest passes to the surviving joint tenants. The court also found that the letter from Allison's attorney did not constitute an enforceable agreement to sell because it was merely part of ongoing negotiations and failed to comply with the Statute of Frauds, as it was not signed by the seller and did not sufficiently describe the real estate.
Concurring - Cavanaugh, J.
No. While compelled by the precedent of Sheridan v. Lucey to agree with the majority's conclusion, the law results in an injustice. The commencement of a partition proceeding unequivocally manifests an intent to terminate the joint tenancy. The failure to complete the severance is due only to the external event of death, not a retreat by the petitioner. The author notes a discrepancy in the law, as a tenancy by the entireties can be severed simply by one spouse suing the other over misappropriation of property, and argues there is no logical basis for treating an ordinary joint tenancy differently.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the formalistic and strict requirements for severing a joint tenancy established in prior precedent, specifically the need for an irrevocable act. It clarifies that a party's clear intent to sever, even when formalized by filing a lawsuit, is insufficient without a final judgment or a binding contract. The ruling underscores the survivorship feature as a powerful default that can only be defeated by completing the legal severance process during the tenant's lifetime. The concurrence highlights the potential inequity of this rule, where the clear intent of a deceased party is frustrated by the slowness of the legal process.
