Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie
631 A.2d 77, 332 Md. 279 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
State law can impliedly preempt local ordinances when the General Assembly has legislated so comprehensively in a particular field, such as cigarette vending machine licensing, that it demonstrates an intent to occupy the entire regulatory domain, even if the local law targets an aspect not explicitly addressed by state law.
Facts:
- On July 23, 1990, the City of Takoma Park enacted Ordinance No. 1990-39, requiring a city permit for cigarette vending machines and restricting their placement to locations not generally accessible to minors.
- On April 15, 1991, the City of Bowie enacted ordinance 0-1-91, which was nearly identical to Takoma Park's, imposing similar restrictions and requiring city licenses for vending machines.
- Allied Vending, Inc. and D.C. Vending Co., Inc. (the vendors) were licensed by the State of Maryland to operate cigarette vending machines in both Bowie and Takoma Park.
- Allied Vending operated machines in several Bowie locations, including Bob’s Big Boy Restaurant, Bowie Golf and Country Club, and Pizza Cafe, under oral agreements paying monthly commissions to the premises owners.
- D.C. Vending operated a machine at the New Hampshire Motor Inn in Takoma Park under a similar oral agreement.
- The trial court found that all cigarette vending machines involved in this case were located in places generally accessible to minors.
- Maryland Code, Article 56, §§ 607 through 631, established a comprehensive state licensing scheme requiring vendors to obtain two licenses per machine (either a cigarette vending machine operator's or retailer's license, plus a 'county license').
- Maryland law, Article 27, Section 404, prohibited the sale of tobacco products to minors under 18 and Section 617(b)(3) required vending machines to display warning labels regarding age requirements and penalties.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 12, 1991, Allied Vending, Inc. and D.C. Vending Co., Inc. (appellants) filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (trial court) against the City of Bowie, City of Takoma Park, and the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County (appellees).
- The vendors sought declaratory relief that the ordinances were invalid and requested interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief.
- The State's Attorney was dismissed from the action by stipulation, agreeing to be bound by the judgment rendered in the action.
- The request for interlocutory injunctive relief became moot when the municipalities agreed not to enforce the ordinances against the vendors pending resolution in the circuit court.
- Following a two-day trial, the circuit court filed an extensive written opinion ruling that both ordinances were valid and enforceable, rejecting all of the vendors’ arguments.
- The vendors appealed the circuit court's decision to the Court of Special Appeals.
- The vendors then petitioned the Maryland Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, which was granted prior to any consideration of the case by the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Are municipal ordinances that restrict the placement of state-licensed cigarette vending machines to locations not generally accessible to minors pre-empted by Maryland's comprehensive state cigarette licensing scheme?
Opinions:
Majority - Karwacki, Judge
Yes, the municipal ordinances are pre-empted by state law, specifically the cigarette licensing scheme provided by Maryland Code, Article 56, §§ 607 through 631. The General Assembly demonstrated an intent to occupy the entire field of regulating cigarette vending machine sales through its comprehensive state-licensing scheme. This scheme encompasses multiple license types for each machine, specifies application contents, mandates issuance if requirements are met, authorizes licensed business, sets terms and renewals, includes display and labeling requirements (e.g., age warning), provides for inspections, and establishes grounds for denial/suspension/revocation of licenses with criminal penalties for violations. This historical and comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework, including recent legislative activity to curb sales to minors, evidences the State's exclusive control. While the local ordinances address a specific aspect (physical location) not explicitly covered, a two-tiered regulatory system would lead to chaos and confusion, potentially banning machines where state licenses permit their operation. The phrase "[i]n addition to any other license required by law" in state statute was merely an affirmation of existing state and county licenses, not an express grant of authority to municipalities to create new regulatory licenses. Unlike cases where local laws were not preempted (e.g., Harker, Ad + Soil), the state law here lacks provisions requiring compliance with local ordinances or references to concurrent local legislative authority.
Dissenting - Rodowsky, Judge
No, the municipal ordinances should not be pre-empted because the state statutes, when properly understood historically and functionally, do not demonstrate an intent to occupy the entire field of cigarette vending machine regulation. The state laws are a conglomeration of distinct enactments, largely revenue measures, economic regulations, or specific age restrictions, not a unified, health-based regulatory scheme. The code revision process, which restyled these acts, did not change their substantive purpose or convert them into comprehensive health regulations. The state's criminal statute (Art. 27, §§ 404-405) sets a minimum age for purchase and requires warning labels on machines, but this is a specific, limited regulation, not a blanket preemption. There is no conflict with the municipal ordinances, which complement state law by addressing the physical location of machines to prevent minor access, a matter not specifically addressed by state law. The General Assembly's failure to enact state-wide bans or location restrictions, despite having opportunities to do so, does not imply preemption; rather, it suggests it left room for local governments to address the issue. The state expressly preempts local taxation of cigarettes (TG § 12-102(b)), demonstrating that when the legislature intends preemption, it does so explicitly.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of implied preemption in Maryland, particularly when the state has enacted a comprehensive licensing and regulatory scheme for a specific industry or activity. It establishes that even if a local ordinance addresses a particular aspect not explicitly covered by state law, the overall 'comprehensiveness' of the state's regulation can still lead to preemption. The ruling limits the ability of local governments to impose additional regulatory burdens on state-licensed entities, emphasizing the potential for chaos and confusion if a patchwork of local rules were permitted. This makes it more challenging for local jurisdictions to enact supplementary health and safety regulations for state-regulated areas without clear legislative grants of concurrent authority.
