Yes. It's enough. If an employee presents a basic case of discrimination and gives the jury enough reason to believe the company's excuse is phony, the jury can decide the real reason was discrimination. The lower court was wrong to say the employee needed a 'smoking gun' or extra proof. When a company lies about why it fired someone, it's common sense for a jury to think they're hiding an illegal reason, like age discrimination. Judges shouldn't overrule a jury just because they would have seen the evidence differently.

Yes. I agree completely. It should be very rare for a judge to throw out a case once the employee has shown 1) some evidence of discrimination and 2) that the company's story is probably false. If someone lies to you about why they did something, you can assume they're hiding the real, bad reason. The jury should almost always be the one to make that call.

Yes, Reeves can win his case. The Supreme Court said if a person shows they were treated unfairly compared to younger workers and the company's reason for firing them seems untrue, that can be enough to prove age discrimination. The Court said the most important question is whether the company intended to discriminate, and juries should be allowed to decide that based on the evidence.

Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority but said there might be some cases where a person needs extra evidence to prove age discrimination. However, she thinks those cases would be rare. Usually, if someone shows they were treated worse than younger workers and the company's reason seems like a lie, it makes sense to think discrimination was the real reason unless it's absolutely proven otherwise.

The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.

The McDonnell Douglas framework is comprised of three steps:(1) the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination or retaliation;(2) the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action;(3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance …

"Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge."

Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, "[t] he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."

The Court must " `disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.'"Id

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

"The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination."

"[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."

Our supreme court has held that "proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence may be quite persuasive. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is covering up a discriminatory purpose" as long as the trier of fact could infer the reason is not only pretext but pretext for …

Yes. A plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. The Court of Appeals erred by assuming that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination to sustain a jury's finding of intentional discrimination. Citing its prior holding in *St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks*, the Court reasoned that the factfinder’s disbelief of the employer’s proffered reason, together with the elements of the prima facie case, can suffice to show intentional discrimination. Proving the employer's explanation is 'unworthy of credence' is a form of circumstantial evidence from which a jury may reasonably infer that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. While such a showing will not always be adequate, in this case, Reeves not only established a prima facie case and created a jury issue as to the falsity of the employer's explanation, but he also introduced additional evidence of age-based animus by Chesnut, who was the principal decisionmaker. Therefore, there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict.

Yes. The Court correctly holds that evidence establishing a prima facie case and evidence showing the employer's explanation was false are sufficient for a plaintiff to survive judgment as a matter of law. I write separately to emphasize that circumstances requiring a plaintiff to submit evidence beyond these two categories should be uncommon. Based on the commonsense principle that a party's dishonesty about a material fact can be treated as evidence of culpability, a false explanation for an adverse employment action gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant is masking an illegal motivation. Unless there is conclusive evidence that discrimination could not have been the true motivation, the ultimate question of liability should ordinarily not be taken from the jury once the plaintiff has made this two-part showing.

Yes. The Court held that a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. The Court reasoned that once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may be the most likely alternative explanation. The Court emphasized that the ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated, and that courts should not treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.

Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority but wrote separately to note that there may be instances where a plaintiff is required to submit evidence beyond the prima facie case and showing pretext to survive judgment as a matter of law. However, she anticipated that such instances would be uncommon, as once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and shows the employer's proffered reason is false, it is rational to infer discrimination was the real reason unless conclusively demonstrated otherwise.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

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