Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
522 U.S. 359 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is permitted to conduct an internal poll of employees regarding their support for an incumbent union if the employer has a good-faith reasonable doubt about the union's majority support. A reviewing court must judge the National Labor Relations Board's factual findings against the ordinary meaning of the 'reasonable doubt' standard, not a heightened standard that the Board may have applied in practice.
Facts:
- Mack Trucks, Inc. operated a factory branch in Allentown, Pennsylvania, where employees were represented by Local Lodge 724.
- In May 1990, Mack announced it was selling the branch.
- Several of the branch's managers formed a new company, Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc., which purchased the business in December 1990.
- Allentown hired 32 of the original 45 Mack employees to continue working at the facility.
- During the hiring process, eight employees made statements to Allentown's new owners indicating they no longer supported the union.
- Ron Mohr, a union shop steward and member of the bargaining committee, told a manager he felt the employees did not want a union and that the union would lose a vote if one were held.
- Kermit Bloch, a night-shift mechanic, informed a manager that the entire night shift, consisting of five or six employees, did not want the union.
Procedural Posture:
- Local 724 filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) against Allentown Mack Sales.
- An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Allentown's poll violated the National Labor Relations Act because the company lacked an 'objective reasonable doubt' about the union's majority support.
- The full NLRB adopted the ALJ's findings and ordered Allentown, the respondent, to recognize and bargain with the union.
- Allentown, as petitioner, sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does an employer possess a 'good-faith reasonable doubt' about a union's majority support, thereby permitting it to conduct a poll, when it has direct statements of opposition from approximately 20% of employees, combined with secondhand reports and statements of general dissatisfaction from other employees?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
Yes. An employer possesses a good-faith reasonable doubt when, based on objective considerations, it has a genuine uncertainty as to whether a union continues to enjoy majority support. The National Labor Relations Board’s conclusion that Allentown lacked such a doubt was not supported by substantial evidence. The Board misconstrued 'doubt' to mean 'disbelief' or certainty of non-support, when its plain meaning is 'uncertainty.' Furthermore, the Board erred by refusing to credit probative circumstantial evidence. It improperly disregarded an employee's statement of dissatisfaction with union representation, an employee's report that the entire night shift opposed the union, and a union steward’s prediction that the union would lose an election. Taken together, the direct statements from 7-8 employees (about 20% of the unit) and these highly probative secondhand accounts were more than sufficient to create a reasonable uncertainty about the union's majority status. While the Board's 'reasonable doubt' standard is facially rational, the Board cannot covertly heighten this standard by systematically undervaluing relevant evidence; it must apply the standard as it is written.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes. While the majority correctly concluded that the Board’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence, its holding that the Board's underlying 'reasonable doubt' standard is rational was incorrect. The standard itself is irrational and inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act because it requires the same high evidentiary showing to conduct a poll as it does to unilaterally withdraw recognition from a union. This renders polling practically useless, as an employer can only conduct a poll in circumstances where it already has enough evidence to take the more drastic step of withdrawal. This severe restriction on an employer's ability to ascertain employee sentiment is not supported by the Act and raises serious First Amendment concerns by limiting non-coercive employer speech.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Breyer
No. The employer did not possess a 'good-faith reasonable doubt' because the Board's conclusion to the contrary was supported by substantial evidence. The majority overstepped the proper standard of review by substituting its own judgment for the Board’s expertise in weighing workplace evidence. The majority also misread the Board's standard by focusing on 'doubt' while ignoring the crucial requirement that the doubt be based on 'objective considerations.' The Board has developed, through its case law, an understanding of what constitutes reliable, objective evidence. It was therefore reasonable for the Board to discount an employee's statement made during a potentially coercive job interview, an unsubstantiated report about the views of other employees, and a vague prediction about an election's outcome. The Court should have deferred to the Board's reasonable application of its own well-established standard.
Analysis:
This decision significantly impacts both labor and administrative law. For labor law, it clarifies and arguably lowers the evidentiary bar for employers seeking to challenge an incumbent union's majority status, giving more weight to circumstantial and secondhand evidence of employee disaffection. For administrative law, the ruling serves as a major check on agency power, holding that an agency cannot engage in covert rulemaking by consistently applying a de facto stricter standard than the one it formally announces. It reinforces the role of judicial review in ensuring that agencies engage in 'reasoned decisionmaking' and that their factual findings are evaluated against the plain meaning of their stated legal standards, preventing them from 'disguising policymaking as factfinding.'
