Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.
439 F.3d 1236, 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 257, 11 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 659 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A post-judgment motion filed under FRCP 59(e) within the 10-day window does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal unless it also satisfies FRCP 7(b)(1) by stating the grounds for relief with reasonable particularity. A "skeletal" motion that fails to state any grounds is insufficient to pause the appellate deadline.
Facts:
- Peggy Allender was an employee of Raytheon Aircraft Company.
- Allender suffered from facial pain arising from a root canal procedure, a condition Raytheon had previously certified as a serious medical condition under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
- Raytheon terminated Allender's employment for excessive absences.
- Allender claimed her absences were a result of her FMLA-qualifying medical condition, while Raytheon argued she did not provide proper notice or certification for that specific leave.
Procedural Posture:
- Peggy Allender sued Raytheon Aircraft Company in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging interference with her FMLA rights.
- On October 15, 2004, the district court entered a final order granting summary judgment in favor of Raytheon.
- Allender filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under FRCP 59(e) on October 22, 2004, which did not state any grounds for relief but requested an extension to file a supporting memorandum.
- The district court granted the extension, and Allender filed her supporting memorandum on November 15, 2004.
- The district court, finding the initial motion was incomplete and therefore untimely, converted it into a motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b).
- On February 7, 2005, the district court denied the converted Rule 60(b) motion.
- Allender (appellant) filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit challenging the district court's orders, with Raytheon as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), filed within the ten-day deadline but failing to state any particular grounds for relief as required by Rule 7(b)(1), successfully toll the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal?
Opinions:
Majority - McConnell, Circuit Judge.
No. A motion filed under Rule 59(e) is insufficient to toll the time for appeal unless it complies with Rule 7(b)(1)'s requirement to 'state with particularity the grounds therefor.' Allender's motion, filed on October 22, was a skeletal motion that stated no grounds for relief and merely requested an extension of time. Because it lacked any substance, it was not a properly filed motion and therefore did not pause the 30-day deadline to file a notice of appeal. The court also rejected Allender's 'unique circumstances' argument, holding that a party cannot reasonably rely on a district court's grant of a time extension when the rules, specifically Rule 6(b), expressly prohibit such an extension for a Rule 59(e) motion. Consequently, the notice of appeal regarding the summary judgment was untimely, and the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review it.
Analysis:
This decision underscores the critical importance of procedural precision in federal litigation, particularly concerning post-judgment motions and appellate deadlines. It clarifies that simply filing a document titled "Rule 59(e) motion" is insufficient; the motion must be substantively complete by stating specific grounds for relief to toll the appeal clock. This holding serves as a strong warning to practitioners against using placeholder or "skeletal" motions to buy time, as doing so constitutes a fatal jurisdictional error that forfeits a client's right to appeal the merits of their case. The ruling reinforces that appellate jurisdiction is strict and not subject to equitable exceptions for errors explicitly prohibited by procedural rules.
