Allen v. State
123 P.3d 1106, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 131, 2005 WL 3081536 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of necessity if they present some evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that a reasonable person in their position would have believed there was no adequate, reasonably available alternative to committing the offense.
Facts:
- Dominic Allen was a passenger in a car being driven by his mother, Sharon Allen.
- While driving, Sharon Allen began suffering from fatigue and double vision, recurring symptoms from a prior injury, causing her to weave on the road.
- Due to her symptoms, Sharon Allen pulled the car over, unable to continue driving.
- Dominic Allen, believing his mother needed medical attention, decided to drive to a liquor store approximately half a mile away where he knew there was a telephone to call for help.
- Allen's driver's license was suspended at the time he chose to drive the car.
- While driving toward the liquor store, Allen passed a strip club that was closer than the liquor store.
- A state trooper initiated a traffic stop because Allen was driving with his headlights off.
Procedural Posture:
- Dominic Allen was charged in district court with driving with a suspended license and violating conditions of release.
- Prior to trial, Allen's counsel notified the court of his intent to raise the affirmative defense of necessity.
- The trial judge held a hearing and considered an offer of proof from the defense, which included testimony from Allen's mother.
- The trial judge ruled that Allen had an adequate and reasonable alternative to breaking the law.
- Consequently, the judge precluded Allen from presenting the necessity defense and refused to instruct the jury on it.
- Allen was convicted of the charges.
- Allen, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Alaska, with the State as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity when the defendant presents some evidence that they reasonably believed leaving an ill passenger alone to walk for help was not an adequate alternative to driving with a suspended license?
Opinions:
Majority - Mannheimer, Judge
Yes. A trial court errs by taking the question of the adequacy of alternatives away from the jury when the defendant has presented some evidence to support their claim. To receive a jury instruction on necessity, a defendant must present some evidence for each element of the defense. The reasonableness of the defendant's belief that no adequate alternative existed is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant's position. Here, Allen offered evidence that he believed his mother needed speedy medical attention and that leaving her alone in the car to walk to a phone was not a reasonable alternative. Because a jury, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Allen, could find that his belief was reasonable, it was an error for the trial judge to preclude the defense and refuse the jury instruction.
Dissenting - Stewart, Judge
No. The trial court did not err because the adequacy of available alternatives is a question of law for the court to decide. A defendant must present some evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find their belief was reasonable. In this case, Allen had an obvious and adequate legal alternative: he could have walked less than half a mile to use a telephone. The record shows no reason, such as weather or physical disability, that would make walking unreasonable. Therefore, as a matter of law, Allen had an adequate alternative and was not entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the roles of the judge and jury in assessing the necessity defense, particularly the element of 'no adequate alternative.' The majority opinion lowers the threshold for a defendant to get a necessity instruction, emphasizing that if there is any plausible evidence supporting the defendant's subjective but reasonable belief, the issue becomes a question of fact for the jury. This potentially broadens the availability of the necessity defense, as it shifts a significant part of the gatekeeping function from the judge to the jury. It establishes that the 'adequacy' of an alternative is not merely a matter of physical possibility but includes contextual factors that a jury is well-suited to evaluate.
