Allen Thompson v. City of Waco, Texas
764 F.3d 500 (2014)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A significant and material diminishment of an employee's core job responsibilities can constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII, even without a change in pay or title, if the change makes the position objectively worse.
Facts:
- Allen Thompson is an African American detective in the Waco Police Department.
- The Department suspended Thompson and two white detectives based on allegations that they had falsified time sheets.
- After being reinstated, the Department imposed written restrictions on Thompson that it did not impose on the two white detectives.
- These restrictions prohibited Thompson from performing key detective duties, including searching for evidence without supervision, logging evidence, working undercover, being an affiant in a criminal case, and serving as a lead investigator.
- Thompson alleged these restrictions stripped him of the integral and material responsibilities of a detective, effectively demoting him to an assistant's role.
- Thompson claimed his new position had diminished material responsibilities, was less prestigious, hindered his opportunities for advancement, and was less interesting.
Procedural Posture:
- Allen Thompson filed a lawsuit against the City of Waco in the U.S. District Court, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII.
- The City of Waco filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
- The district court granted the City's motion, dismissing Thompson's claims on the grounds that he failed to allege an adverse employment action.
- Thompson, as the appellant, appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does stripping a detective of his core investigative responsibilities, while leaving his title and pay intact, constitute an 'adverse employment action' sufficient to state a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII?
Opinions:
Majority - Higginson, J.
Yes. A change in job responsibilities can be so significant and material that it rises to the level of an adverse employment action, equivalent to a demotion. The court reasoned that an employment action does not need to result in a decrease in pay or title to be a demotion; it qualifies if the new position is objectively worse, such as being less prestigious, less interesting, or providing less room for advancement. Here, Thompson plausibly alleged that he lost the essential functions of a detective, making him effectively an assistant to other detectives. The court rejected the city's formalistic argument that this was not a 'transfer,' stating that rewriting a job description can have the same discriminatory effect as a formal reassignment and is covered by Title VII's protection of the 'terms, conditions, or privileges' of employment.
Dissenting - Smith, J.
No. The plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to meet the Fifth Circuit's strict requirement of an 'ultimate' employment action. The dissent argued that Fifth Circuit precedent limits actionable adverse employment actions to ultimate decisions like hiring, firing, demoting, or changes in compensation. A loss of some job responsibilities, without more, does not meet this high standard. The majority, by allowing this claim to proceed, improperly imports the lower 'materially adverse' standard from other circuits and misapplies precedent concerning job transfers to a situation involving only a restriction of duties within the same position. Thompson remains a detective in title and pay, and therefore has not suffered an 'ultimate employment action' under controlling circuit law.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the 'adverse employment action' analysis in the Fifth Circuit is not purely formalistic. It establishes that a de facto demotion, accomplished by stripping an employee of core responsibilities, is actionable under Title VII even without a formal change in title or pay. This holding arguably moves the Fifth Circuit's traditionally strict 'ultimate employment decision' standard closer to the more flexible 'materially adverse' standard used in other circuits, as noted by the dissent. The case signals that courts in this circuit will look at the substantive reality of an employee's job duties, rather than just official labels, when determining if a plausible discrimination claim has been stated.
